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ABSTRACT
The majority of Americans report psychological or physical symptoms due to stress (APA,
2007). When stressed, people engage in coping strategies that differentially affect psychological
distress. Psychologically flexible coping is associated with more positive outcomes (e.g., Ruiz,
2010; Sturmey, 2009), while psychologically inflexible strategies have been linked to greater
psychological distress (e.g., Marcks & Woods, 2005; Hayes et al, 2006). Within the
psychological flexibility model, few studies have looked at the interaction between severity of
naturally occurring stressors and coping strategy and their influence on psychological distress.
The current study further investigated the relationship between coping strategy and severity of
stressor while addressing several limitations of a previous pilot study. Coping strategy items
were grouped through a principal components analysis to assist in the assessment of the
relationship between coping strategy and severity of stressor as it predicts psychological distress.
Four components were extracted with poor to adequate internal consistency. Severity of stress
significantly predicted psychological distress. Substance use as a coping strategy significantly
predicted psychological distress when controlling for severity of stressor (β = -15.08, t(443) = 7.06, p <.001, pr2 = .121). There were two significant interactions. The effect of severity of
stressor on overall psychological distress is conditional on our measure of mindfulness and
engagement as a coping strategy (β = -.02, t(442) = -2.18, p = .030, pr2 = .01, ΔR2 = .010). The
effects of severity of stressor on overall psychological distress were also found to be conditional
on our measure of present focused values as a coping strategy, (β = -.03, t(442) = -2.99, p = .003,
pr2 = .020, ΔR2 = .018).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the American Psychological Association began tracking data related to stress
and the American population. At that time, over three-fourths of Americans reported either
physical or psychological symptoms associated with stress (APA, 2008). These included
headaches (44%), feeling nervous (45%), lying awake at night (48%), fatigue (51%), and upset
stomach (34%). Other research has suggested that stress can affect many aspects of a person’s
wellbeing such as memory (Schwabe, Joels, Roozendaal, Wolf, & Oitzl, 2012), allergy response
(Trueba et al, 2013) and the brain’s response to stress (Wilson, Hansen, & Li, 2011). Childhood
stress has been linked to the development of anxiety and depression later in life (Tsoory, Cohen,
& Richter-Levin, 2007) as well as cognitive deficits and emotion dysregulation (Pechtel &
Pizzagalli, 2011). Furthermore, many Americans deal with stress in maladaptive ways, such as
unhealthy eating, smoking and alcohol consumption, and sedentary coping strategies (APA
2007).
The 2013 APA update on stress indicated that teens are reporting levels of stress during
the school year above what they consider to be healthy (5.8 v. 3.9) and at or above adults’
reported levels of stress (5.8 v. 5.1) and that they do not typically recognize the effect of stress
on their physical and emotional health (APA, 2014). Furthermore, the 2013 update indicates that
both teens’ and adults’ sleep is affected by stress and that both engage in unhealthy eating habits
(e.g. overeating, skipping meals) when stressed and that teens may not have well developed
coping strategies to handle the stress (APA, 2014). Given the prevalence of stress and the
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difficulty many face with coping, the current study seeks to investigate further the relationship
between coping and stressors on psychological distress.
Coping strategies have historically been looked at from a personality theory perspective,
which is descriptive by nature. In this perspective, coping has been generally categorized into
either problem-focused or active coping and emotion-focused coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980;
Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Folkman and Lazarus (1980) found that health related
stressors were more likely associated with emotion-focused strategies; work related stress was
associated with problem-focused strategies. If a stressor is appraised as workable, individuals
employ more problem-focused strategies; if the stressor is appraised as having to be tolerated,
individuals employ more emotion-focused strategies.
Coping Prevalence Data
Although there is a considerable body of data on coping within several coping models,
there is little known of the prevalence of specific coping strategies cast within the theoretical
framework of an empirically-supported therapeutic model. The psychological flexibility model is
a model of psychological functioning that undergirds Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
(Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011). While previous measures of coping can be conceptualized
within this model, these measures were not designed to assess the prevalence of coping strategies
consistent with psychological flexibility.
Psychological Flexibility Consistent Coping Strategies
The psychological flexibility model conceptualizes the distress that humans experience as
both universal and normal. This conceptualization is similar to Thomas Szasz’s “problems in
living” model, in which suffering is related to the struggle with human distress rather than an
abnormal quality within that person (1960). That is, psychological struggles are seen as evidence
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of a lack of psychological flexibility rather than evidence of a psychological disorder.
Psychological flexibility is defined as “the ability to be in the present moment with full
awareness and openness to our experience, and to take action guided by our values” (Harris,
2009 p. 12). From this conceptualization of function and dysfunction, the psychological
flexibility model suggests interventions to help people live a meaningful life regardless of the
presence or absence of symptoms. Unlike Szasz, the psychological flexibility model is deeply
grounded in basic behavior analysis (Hayes, et al., 2012; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche,
2001).
Emerging evidence has supported the psychological flexibility model as a valid
conceptualization of ways of coping with psychological difficulties. A meta-analysis of ACT
component studies suggests that intervening in these areas can improve functioning (Levin et al,
2012a). In addition to support for the model, evidence also suggests that Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy as a treatment package can be useful for people suffering from a wide
variety of problems such as chronic pain, hospitalization in people with psychosis, anxiety,
depression, and job-related burnout (Ruiz, 2010; Haan & McCracken, 2014; Bluett et al., 2014).
The model has also been successfully applied to performance, adjustment, and wellbeing in
nonclinical samples (Bond & Bunce, 2000; Hayes et al, 2004; Lillis & Hayes, 2007; Masuda et
al, 2007; Luoma et al, 2008; Ruiz & Luciano, 2009; Flaxman & Bond, 2010; Muto, Hayes, &
Jeffcoat, 2011; Brinkborg, Michanek, Hesser, & Berglund, 2011; Biglan et al, 2011). All metaanalyses conducted to date suggest that ACT outperforms control and TAU for a wide variety of
difficulties (Hayes et al., 2006; Öst, 2008; Powers, Vording, & Emmelkamp, 2009; Ruiz, 2010).
While there has been some critique that the evidence does not show that ACT outperforms CBT
(Öst, 2008; Powers, Vording, & Emmelkamp, 2009), the evidence to date suggests that the

3

psychological flexibility model is a viable theoretical conceptualization of psychological distress
as well as a useful therapeutic model.
For functional purposes, the model separates psychological flexibility into six processes:
contact with the present moment, acceptance, defusion, self-as context, values, and committed
action. However, these processes do not operate independently. Representations of these
connections often cluster the processes into larger categories. One conceptualization of the
processes clusters them into two groups: mindfulness and acceptance processes and commitment
and behavior change processes (Hayes & Strosahl, 2004, p. 7). Mindfulness and acceptance
processes include acceptance and defusion while commitment and behavior change processes
involve values and committed action; both clusters of processes include present moment focus
and self-as-context.
Mindfulness and Acceptance Processes
Mindfulness is not a new concept, nor is it exclusive to the psychological flexibility
conceptualization. Its roots stretch back into Buddhist tradition and extend throughout many
belief systems and therapeutic practices today (Williams & Lynn, 2010). Other therapies that
include mindfulness include Dialectical Behavior Therapy (Linehan, 1993), Mindfulness-Based
Stress Reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1982), and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal,
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). While the focus of this study is not to examine other therapies that
incorporate mindfulness, data does suggest that mindfulness-based treatment packages have been
found to be effective in psychiatric and non-psychiatric populations (Chiesa & Serretti, 2011;
Chiesa & Serretti, 2009; Bohlmeijer, Prenger, Taal, & Cuijpers, 2010; Grossman, Niemann,
Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Piet & Hougaard, 2011).
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Mindfulness has been defined as “bringing one’s complete attention to the experiences
occurring in the present moment, in a nonjudgmental or accepting way” (Baer et al, 2006).
Mindfulness also involves the focusing of attention on both internal and external experience
(Baer & Huss, 2008). From an ACT perspective, mindfulness involves the following four
processes: contact with the present moment, acceptance, defusion, and self-as-context.
Contact with the Present Moment. One of the core processes of ACT is contact with
the present moment. This refers to a moment-by-moment, intentional attending to one’s
experience (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 202). Based on the previously cited definition of
mindfulness (Baer et al, 2006), bringing suggests an intentional act in the attention. For example,
if someone is tasked with bringing food to a gathering, typically he has to think about what to
bring, prepare or buy it, and transport it from one place to another. All of these are deliberate
actions that are purposefully engaged. In contacting the present moment, purposeful attending is
brought to one’s experience.
Within the framework of mindfulness, attention has the dual qualities of flexibility and
focus (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 79). It can be shifted as needed from one aspect to
another of experience. For example, this attention can be shifted from internal to external
experience (Baer & Huss, 2008).
Acceptance. The definition of mindfulness also touches on the nonjudgmental
acceptance of experience. A key component of acceptance is the willingness to contact the
present moment even in the presence of aversive stimuli (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011 p.
77). This acceptance is not a resignation to the circumstances (e.g. “I give up trying because
there is no point.”). Neither is it changing one’s thoughts and feelings in order to like the
situation. Acceptance involves a nonjudgmental stance that is distinguished from wanting, liking,
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or approving of the experience (Wilson & DuFrene, 2009, p. 47). The experience is neither good
nor bad, neither right nor wrong, but simply is. For example, a person with anxiety can accept
having anxiety symptoms without liking or wanting anxiety.
Defusion. According to the psychological flexibility model, defusion “enables the
individual to let go of needless entanglement with distressing, unwanted private events and
experiences and to view them in a nonjudgmental way as merely ongoing mental activity.”
(Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 68). According to Blackledge (2007), defusion promotes
psychological flexibility by “address[ing] problematic stimulus functions that arise through
indirect (verbal) processes, as defined by RFT” (p.557).
Investigations in the ways verbal processes or verbal rules generate insensitivity to
directly experienced contingencies are relevant to this process. For example, participants in
human operant research have been shown to be insensitive to changes in schedules of
reinforcement after having been given rules for winning the most points when compared to
participants whose behavior was instead shaped by direct contact with contingencies (Shimoff,
Catania, & Matthews, 1981). Similarly, within the psychological flexibility model, intervention
on client thoughts about “unworthiness” would not necessarily aim at removing the painful
thoughts, which are often very persistent (Vittengl, Clark, Dunn, & Jarrett, 2007), but instead to
lessen the stimulus control exerted by these thoughts when they do arise. Defusion techniques
help to loosen the stranglehold of believability of thoughts so that they may be experienced as
”mental activity” rather than as something that must be acted upon or obeyed (Hayes, Strosahl,
& Wilson, 2011, p. 68).
Self-as-context. Self-as-context is the process of recognizing and interacting with
yourself as a vessel through which a multitude of experiences pass, not as the thoughts that you
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have about yourself or as a rigid, fixed character. These experiences change and may contradict
one another. For example, some days you may have very positive thoughts about yourself, only
to have very self-condemning thoughts on another day. However, the vessel remains the same,
able to observe and witness each of these experiences. Hayes (1984) in examining this
behavioral analysis of self also refers to this as you-as-perspective. Hayes notes that not only do
we “see” the world but we can also “see” that we “see” the world. This meta-seeing is done from
a particular perspective. We can only see that we experience the world from our own
perspective, thus the self is the context from which the entire world is experienced. Furthermore,
although our experiences of the world change, the perspective from which we see them (“you-asperspective”) does not change (Hayes, 1984).
For example, a person might think, “I am lazy and worthless”. This would constitute a
thought about whom he is. Recognizing self-as-context would change the interaction we have
with these stories to notice that these are the thoughts and feelings you have about yourself,
rather than who you are. It also allows for flexible perspective taking, which aids in
understanding both the self and others in context.
Self-as-context involves a specific type of relational frames known as deictic relations.
The frames of “I-You,” “Here-There,” and “Now-Then” form the basis of self-as-context
(Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Hayes, 1984). Because deictic relations involve frames
of reference from a particular perspective, these frames are thought to facilitate perspective
taking (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes, &Barnes-Holmes, 2004). Rehfeldt and colleagues (2007)
found that high-functioning children with autism generally made more errors in perspective
taking than typically developing children; researchers also found that performance on relational
perspective taking tasks improves with a history of reinforcement for this type of responding.
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Self-as-context and perspective taking facilitates defusion by allowing the individual to
interact with fused cognitive content from a different perspective (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
2011, p. 238).
Mindfulness and Acceptance Processes Data
Acceptance. Several studies have looked at the effectiveness of acceptance as a coping
strategy for a number of difficulties. Results for acceptance-based interventions generally
suggest acceptance is a preferred alternative to suppression and control strategies. Several painrelated studies have found benefits for acceptance-based interventions with respect to pain
tolerance (Gutierrez, Luciano, Rodriguez, & Fink, 2004; McMullen et al. 2008; Masedo &
Esteve, 2007; Hayes et al., 1999; Vowles et al., 1999). Several have also found significant
reductions in believability with respect to pain (Gutierrez et al. 2004; Wicksell, Olsson, & Hayes,
2011) or reasons for behavior (Hayes et al. 1999).
Acceptance interventions have been found to be effective for other stressors. CampbellSills and colleagues (2006b) found that patients with anxiety and depressive symptoms had
lower heart rate and less negative affect after watching an emotional movie clip when instructed
to use acceptance strategies as opposed to suppression strategies. However, there was no
difference in subjective ratings of distress. Levitt and colleagues (2004) found that, among panic
disorder patients, higher willingness to participate as well as lower avoidance and anxiety were
reported for the acceptance condition than suppression on a CO2 challenge. Marcks and Woods
(2007) found that participants who were instructed to actively engage in acceptance, ratings of
willingness to experience accident related thoughts were higher than those who were instructed
to engage in suppression; participants in the acceptance condition also experienced decreases in
intrusive thoughts compared to the suppression condition. Hooper and colleagues (2011) found
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that participants in a mindfulness condition were more likely to approach a spider in a behavioral
approach task (BAT) than people in an unfocused attention or suppression group. Low, Stanton,
and Bower (2008) found that the acceptance group outperformed the evaluation condition, with
respect to heart rate or subjective measures of distress. Forman and colleagues found that
individuals who were low on the Power of Food scale, acceptance-based intervention led to
higher ratings of cravings. However, for those who were high on the measure of Power of Food
scale, the acceptance based intervention resulted in lower cravings and less chocolate
consumption (Forman et al., 2007).
While support for acceptance-based coping is growing, some results are mixed. Some
studies have found no difference between acceptance and other coping strategies on symptom
reduction (Hoffman, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2009; Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer,
2010). Marcks and Woods (2005) found a decrease in discomfort with respect to intrusive
thoughts although there was no decrease in the frequency of thoughts for the acceptance
condition. What is unexplored is the relationship between naturally occurring stressors and
uninstructed coping strategies. In some regards, these might pose a more ecologically valid test
of coping in the face of stressors.
Defusion. While defusion has not been as widely studied as acceptance within the
psychological flexibility model, several studies have been conducted and support the proposed
mechanisms of change and efficacy. McCracken and colleagues (2014) investigated decentering
and its relationship to the psychological flexibility model. Decentering, as measured by the
Experiences Questionnaire, consisted of separate but related factors of self-as-context and
defusion. Modeling of the effects of decentering and other related factors indicate that
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decentering directly and indirectly through acceptance affects depression, mental health, and
social functioning.
Hinton and Gaynor (2010) investigated the effects of a defusion intervention for students
with dysphoria, distress, and low self-esteem. Participants were randomized to receive either the
defusion intervention or waitlist control. Results indicate that the defusion group had greater
changes in distress, depressive symptoms, and self-esteem compared to the waitlist control.
Furthermore, the data also indicated changes in process measures of psychological flexibility and
defusion. When compared to archival data on a supportive therapy, researchers found larger
effect sizes for defusion intervention than supportive therapy (Hinton & Gaynor, 2010).
Kishita and colleagues (2014) found that individuals with high social anxiety who
received a defusion intervention responded more quickly to both anxiety-consistent and
inconsistent trials on a computer task and endorsed more willingness to engage in a difficult task
than those who did not. Participants were also asked to give a five-minute speech; more
participants in the defusion condition than the control condition spoke for the full five minutes.
Hesser and colleagues (2009) looked at defusion with respect to decrease in tinnitus distress and
found that an increase in frequency and peak expressiveness of defusion-related thoughts in the
second session predicted a decrease in distress from tinnitus that was seen at 6 months follow-up.
Studies indicate that psychological flexibility interventions may decrease the believability of
hallucinations (which predicts distress and rehospitalization) in patients with psychosis even
though no direct interventions challenge the veracity of the thoughts (Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006;
Bach & Hayes, 2002). Hooper and colleagues (2012) looked at defusion, thought suppression,
control, cravings, and chocolate consumption. While they found no differences in the amount of
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chocolate eaten during the week, individuals in the defusion group were less likely than those in
the thought suppression or control groups to eat chocolates during the subsequent taste test.
Some studies have also found similar effects on distress for cognitive restructuring and
cognitive defusion interventions with respect to decreases in reported distress (Deacon et al.,
2011;Yovel, Mor, & Shakarov, 2014); furthermore, these studies indicate that restructuring and
defusion function as the processes described in the theories suggest. Moffitt and colleagues
(2012) also investigated the differences between defusion and restructuring as it impacts
chocolate cravings and chocolate consumption. Results indicate that those in the defusion
condition were less likely to eat the chocolate than those in control or restructuring conditions.
Furthermore, the effect of the intervention was conditional on cognitive distress levels prior to
the intervention such that for individuals with more distress, defusion worked better than
restructuring.
Commitment and Behavior Change Processes
Values. Values in the psychological flexibility model are “freely chosen, verbally
constructed consequences of ongoing dynamic, evolving patterns of activity which establish
predominant reinforcers for that activity that are intrinsic in engagement in the valued behavioral
pattern itself” (Wilson & DuFrene, 2009 p. 64). In essence, values are what matters to the person
who holds the value. Because values are internally held, and not necessarily linked to a particular
outcome, the reinforcers for values-directed behavior are in the act of doing the behavior. The
psychological flexibility framework distinguishes between valuing as feeling (e.g. valuing
feeling good) and valuing as action (e.g. valuing living “well”). Because feelings are transient,
the emphasis in this model is on valuing as action (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999, p. 209).
One values-focused exercise, What Do You Want Your Life To Stand For Exercise, involves
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imagining you are a witness to your own funeral. This exercise focuses on what you would most
want important people in your life to say about you when you die and the connection between
that and how you are living life today (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999, p. 215-218). The
purpose of this exercise is to contact valued domains and assess whether the valued domains are
currently being engaged.
Committed Action. Committed action is “a values-based action that occurs at a
particular moment in time and that is deliberately linked to creating a pattern of action that serves
the value” (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 328). In other words, committed action is
engaging in behaviors that are related to one or more valued domains. This process also involves
noticing when behaviors are not consistent with values and re-engaging in behaviors that are
more consistent. This pattern of behaving will fluctuate over time; the return to acting in
accordance with one’s values is as important as the action itself. For example, empirically
supported behavioral interventions, such as exposure, can be conceptualized as committed
action. Committed action involves behaviors that move the actor in a valued direction. ACT
would engage in exposure of aversive stimuli because it takes the client in a valued direction
rather than simply for the sake of eliminating fear.
Present Moment, Values, and Commitment. For some clients, conversations about
values and committed action lead to rumination (past-oriented) or worry (future-oriented). When
engaged in these behaviors, the present moment is not fully contacted (Hayes, Strosahl, &
Wilson, 2011, p. 319, 348). Contact with the present moment allows for an exploration of values
and the private events associated with the values. In addition, contacting the present moment
allows for action in this moment rather than being controlled by entanglement with catastrophic
thoughts about future or the past.
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The previously mentioned values exercise, What Do You Want Your Life To Stand For
Exercise, also exemplifies the connection between present moment processes and values.
Because the exercise engages with the funeral narrative as if it is present, it also allows the
client’s values to become present as well.
Self-as-Context, Values, and Commitment. Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson (2012) argue
that fusion with self-content (e.g. “I am not enough”) leads to a disconnection between values
and committed action (p. 319, 349). Fusion with self-content, such as “I am not enough,” may
impede the ability to explore valued domains. For example, if one believes he is unlovable, then
he is unlikely to engage in exploring the valued domain of relationships. By engaging the self as
context rather than content, it allows the person the flexibility to continue engaging in values
exploration and values-focused behavior even in the context of fused self-content. One exercise
that utilizes both values and perspective taking is the What Do You Want Your Life To Stand For
Exercise; the client takes the perspective of the self later in life and imagines what he might see
and hear at his funeral.
Commitment and Behavior Change Processes Data
Several studies have looked at values and engagement in values–based behavior as
naturally occurring coping strategies. Several chronic pain studies have found a relationship
between values and committed action and desired outcomes in pain clinic settings, patients with
chronic pain in primary care, and in health-care workers (McCracken & Yang, 2006; McCracken
& Velleman, 2010; McCracken & Yang, 2008). McCracken and Vowles (2008) found that
success at living according to values negatively correlated with pain severity, pain-related
distress, pain-related anxiety & avoidance, depression, depression-related interference with
functioning, physical disability, and psychosocial disability and predicted medication use.
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McCracken and Yang (2006) also found significant correlations between values based action and
measures of emotional and physical functioning. Furthermore, values based action accounted for
unique variance above the variance associated with acceptance. McCracken & Yang (2008) also
found significant relationships between values based action and emotional exhaustion, general
health, vitality and emotional functioning in health care workers, with lower success being
associated with poorer outcomes. Ciarriochi, Fisher, and Lane (2010) found success at engaging
in valued areas of living was associated with greater wellbeing, lower avoidance, and less stress
in cancer patients. Furthermore, when value in the health domain was not freely chosen or
internally held, it was associated with high avoidance, lower physical wellbeing, and higher
distress for both practical and emotional problems. Veage and colleagues (2014) investigated the
link between values and workplace success in mental health professionals. They found that
greater congruence between work and life values predicted greater wellbeing overall. In addition,
they found that the pursuit of work related values, which could be conceptualized as committed
action, predicted lower rates of burnout. These studies indicate that naturally occurring contact
with values and committed action are associated with greater physical and psychological
wellbeing.
Several studies have also looked at brief values writing interventions that involve
participants ranking valued domains followed by writing about either a high or low-ranked value.
These writing interventions have led to increased acceptance of smoking information in smokers
(Crocker, Niiya, & Mischowski, 2008), increase in school performance in Latino and AfricanAmerican students (Sherman et al, 2013; Cohen et al. 2006), reduced alcohol consumption
among college freshmen (Armitage, Harris, & Arden, 2011), and reduced body dissatisfaction
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(Armitage, 2012). Two studies have found that engaging with one’s values led to lower cortisol
levels after a stressful task (Creswell, 2005; Gregg et al., 2014).
Behavioral interventions. The empirically supported behavioral techniques employed in
CBT are consistent with ACT and can be conceptualized as committed action (Hayes, Strosahl,
& Wilson, 2011, p. 339-346). Evidence suggests that behavior change as both part of treatment
packages and as a stand alone treatment is effective. Cognitive behavioral therapies broadly
involve changes associated with both thoughts and behaviors; to date, most of the empirically
supported therapies listed by the American Psychological Association fall under the umbrella of
cognitive-behavioral therapies (CBT).
While CBT targets cognition and behavior, several studies have demonstrated that the
cognitive components do not add anything over and above the behavioral activation components.
Jacobson and colleagues (1996) conducted a component analysis of CBT for depression. In this
study, researchers examined the efficacy of behavioral activation alone when compared to
behavioral activation combined with modification of automatic thoughts and the full cognitive
therapy package (which also included interventions on core schema). The results of this study
show that behavioral activation alone works as well as either intervention with added cognitive
components. In addition, cognitive change occurred in the behavioral activation condition even
without direct intervention (Jacobson et al., 1996). Further research has found that behavioral
activation is as effective as cognitive therapy and psychopharmacological treatment (Dimidjian
et al, 2006; Dobson et al., 2008). This line of research has led researchers to question whether the
cognitive components are necessary for treatment. Dimidjian and colleagues (2006) conducted a
randomized control trial also suggests that in severe cases of depression, behavioral activation
outperforms cognitive therapy and is comparable to antidepressant medication (Dimidjian et al.,
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2006). For those who responded to treatment in the initial study, cognitive therapy and
behavioral activation prevented relapse at a higher rate than antidepressant medication (Dobson
et al., 2008).
Within behavioral activation protocols, there has been a shift from “targeting pleasant
events…to understanding the functional aspects of behavior change” (Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggerio,
& Eifert, p. 702). The Brief Behavioral Activation Treatment for Depression (BATD), developed
by Lejuez, Hopko, and Hopko (2001), directly borrows the concept ranking values and
developing patterns of behavior based on highly ranked values from Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy. Questions are asked such as “ What would you like to do?” and “Who
would you like to be?” These two combined function similarly to values and committed action
exercises, with goal setting in context of larger values (Lejuez, Hopko, & Hopko, 2001).
Several studies have investigated the effectiveness of BATD. Hopko and colleagues
(2005) found significant pre to post treatment improvement on quality of life, depression, and
medical outcomes with BATD intervention with cancer patients. Gains were maintained at
follow-up (Hopko et al, 2005). Reynolds and colleagues (2011) adapted BATD to enhance a
college orientation program. While there was no change in depression scores between orientation
as usual and the enhanced orientation, interaction analyses revealed that there was a significant
decrease in problem drinking for those who were in the enhanced orientation. There was no
decrease in the orientation as usual (Reynolds et al, 2011). Gawrysiak, Nicholas, and Hopko
(2009) conducted a one-session modified BATD for moderately depressed college students. This
brief intervention decreased depressive symptoms and increased environmental reward
(Gawrysiak, Nicholas, & Hopko 2009).
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Further meta-analyses of behavioral activation studies suggest that it is comparable to
cognitive therapy for treating depression (Cuijpers, van Straten, & Warmerdam, 2007;
Mazzucchelli, Kane, & Rees, 2009; Sturmey, 2009). The evidence suggests support for
commitment and behavior change processes as an effective component of improvement in
psychological functioning both as interventions and as naturally occurring coping strategies.
Psychological Inflexibility Coping Strategies
The psychological flexibility model suggests that psychological difficulties result from
psychological inflexibility. Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson (2011) also lay out the processes
associated with psychological inflexibility as: “inflexible attention; disruption of chosen values;
inaction or impulsivity; attachment to a conceptualized self; cognitive fusion; and experiential
avoidance,” (p. 63). In the psychological flexibility model, these processes do not always
function maladaptively. Wilson and DuFrene (2009) note that there are times when these
processes can be functional, if not merely harmless (p. 49, 56, 60, 63). However, when these
strategies interfere with valued living, they are considered dysfunctional. All of the coping items
that are considered inconsistent with psychological flexibility can be categorized conceptually as
promoting psychological inflexibility. While these processes are essentially the opposite of the
psychological flexibility processes, below is a brief explanation of these terms.
Inflexible Attention
Inflexible attention lacks the ability to intentionally move from one aspect of experience
to another. There are occasions when this does not matter, such as when playing a video game or
tying one’s shoe. However, when attention is only brought to one aspect of an experience, other
important aspects of the experience may be missed. For example, if someone gives a speech and
only attends to their physical symptoms of anxiety, he may miss other aspects of the experience,
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such as visual cues from the audience. Common manifestations of inflexible attention include
rumination, worry, and inability to maintain attention (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 109).
Disruption of chosen values
Disruption of chosen values refers to disconnection between the person and what is
important to him. This may manifest as a lack of clarity surrounding what is of value. Hayes,
Strosahl, and Wilson (2011) describe this lack of clarity as aimlessness, or a lack of direction and
that “it is only within the context of values that action, acceptance, and defusion come together
into a sensible whole” (p.92). Therefore, disruption of values removes the purpose of engaging in
these behaviors. Without purpose for engagement, the disruption of chosen values may also lead
to a disruption in the pattern of behavior associated with a particular value or set of values.
Inaction or impulsivity
Inaction and impulsivity differ topographically, but both involve behaving inconsistently
with respect to valued action. Committed action involves both behavioral engagement and
intentionality. Inaction lacks behavioral engagement, while impulsivity impedes the ability to
behave intentionally. Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson (2011) suggest that these patterns of behavior
are ineffectual and narrow (p. 94). By narrowing the behavioral repertoire, there is little
opportunity to engage in behaviors that may be reinforcing.
Attachment to conceptualized self
Attachment to conceptualized self involves a rigid belief in the thoughts about oneself.
While there is no inherent “badness” to these thoughts, the attachment to conceptualized self
leads to psychological inflexibility when belief that the thoughts are true leads to a narrowing of
behavior. Hayes and Gregg (2000) argue that our tendency to attempt to make sense of the world
contributes to fusion with self as content. People tend to interact with the world in ways that will
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confirm our beliefs and ignore evidence against their beliefs. The defensiveness and rigidity that
accompany these behaviors inhibits a person’s ability to behave outside of these narrow
conceptualizations (Hayes & Gregg, 2000).
Cognitive fusion
Fusion is similar to the attachment to conceptualized self. However, instead of stories
about the self, this includes stories about the world and how to behave in the world. Fusion
speech has several common attributes such as comparison between the self and others,
perseveration on a particular topic, and justification for why things cannot change (Hayes,
Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 117-119). This often involves rules (e.g. “failure is unacceptable”)
and beliefs about others (e.g. “my mom is a witch”). Holding tightly to these beliefs typically
leads to a narrowing of behavior. If someone believes failure is unacceptable, then he is unlikely
to engage in any activity where failure is a possibility. As mentioned previously, this narrowing
of behavior, when it leads away from valued action, is maladaptive.
Experiential Avoidance
In behavioral terms, avoidance is defined as “the prevention of an aversive stimulus by a
response” (Catania, 2007 p. 379). Therefore, experiential avoidance is defined as the prevention
of aversive stimuli, in this case private events, by responding in ways that change the experience
of the stimuli (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999, p. 58). Experiential avoidance involves
unwillingness to have unpleasant experiences. This unwillingness leads to attempts to avoid the
unpleasant experience by attempting to suppress, avoid, or actively change thoughts and feelings.
Experiential avoidance is the most empirically studied of the psychological inflexibility
processes. It is often measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, which features
questions such as “I worry about not being able to control my thoughts and feelings.”
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Psychological Inflexibility Coping Strategies Data
Avoidance data. Generally, avoidance as a naturally occurring coping strategy has been
associated with distress and poor outcomes. In some newer studies, researchers refer to the
AAQ-II as measuring psychological inflexibility rather than experiential avoidance. However,
for our purposes, these results will be consolidated under avoidance. Avoidance behavior
predicted the frequency of intrusive thoughts at 4 months follow-up in burn survivors (Lawrence,
Fauerbach, & Munster 1996). Avoidant coping in adolescents was associated with both being
more easily distressed overall and with the presence of more chronic stressors (Ebata & Moos
1994). Feldner, Zvolensky, Eifert, & Spira (2003) found when individuals are instructed to
suppress during a physically challenging task (breathing carbon dioxide enriched air),
participants who are high on experiential avoidance report more anxiety; however, there was no
difference between the two groups (high and low experiential avoidance) when participants
engaged in observation as a coping strategy (Feldner et al. 2003). Experiential avoidance was
found to be associated with social phobia (Kashdan et al., 2014); greater distress for people with
anxiety disorders (Panayiotou, Karekla, & Mete, 2014); and depressive symptoms and avoidant
coping for people with Body Dysmorphic Disorder (Wilson, Wilhelm, & Hartmann, 2014).
While anxiety predicted procrastination in a study by Glick, Millstein, & Orsillo (2014), they
found that when experiential avoidance was added to the analyses, it improved prediction of
procrastination above anxiety alone. In addition, Woodruff and colleagues (2014) found that
experiential avoidance predicted more variance than self-compassion on negative measures of
psychological health.
Furthermore, meta-analyses of the experiential avoidance data suggest that it is highly
positively correlated with a wide variety of negative outcomes while being negatively correlated
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with quality of life (Ruiz, 2010; Hayes et al., 2006). In a study by Levin and colleagues (2014),
psychological inflexibility was examined across a number of current and lifetime history of
disorders to evaluate its status as a transdiagnostic model. They found that inflexibility was
associated with both lifetime and current depression and anxiety, lifetime history of eating
disorder, and with an increased rate of comorbidity with other anxiety, depression, and substance
use disorders (Levin et al., 2014).
In addition, the level of experiential avoidance can moderate the relationship between
stressors and/or coping strategies and quality of life. Avoidance has been found to mediate the
relationship between perfectionism and test anxiety (Weiner & Carton, 2012), the relation
between rumination and complicated grief and depression (Eisma et al. 2013), the relation
between anxiety sensitivity and social anxiety (Panayiotou, Karekla, & Panayiotou, 2014), the
relation between social anxiety and marijuana use motives (Buckner et al. 2014), the relation
between childhood physical abuse and revictimization in a dating relationship (Fiorillo, Papa, &
Follette, 2013), the relation between thought suppression and problem gambling (Riley, 2014),
the relation between childhood shame experiences and depression (Dinis et al., 2015), the
relation between mindfulness and worry (Ruiz, 2014), and partially mediates the relationship
between PTSD and SAD and ratings of quality of life in survivors of the Kosovo War (Kashdan,
Morina, & Priebe, 2009). Experiential avoidance has also been found to mediate the effects of
suppression and reappraisal on emotional experience with respect to anxiety-related distress
(Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006).
Kashdan and colleagues (2009) also found that individuals who did not have either social
anxiety disorder or emotional avoidance had a higher quality of life; however, having either
social anxiety disorder or emotional avoidance was associated with lower quality of life.
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Kashdan and Kane (2010) found that individuals who are high in emotional avoidance had lower
post-traumatic growth and lower meaning in life when they had more PTSD symptoms.
However, post-traumatic growth was higher for participants with more PTSD symptoms when
they also had low emotional avoidance; there was no difference in meaning in life between
individuals who have more or fewer symptoms when they also had low experiential avoidance
Levin and colleagues (2012b) found that significantly higher levels of experiential avoidance
were associated with alcohol use. The relationship between distress and alcohol use disorders
was mediated by experiential avoidance. In addition, a study by Stotts and colleagues (2014)
found that non-responders to contingency management treatment for cocaine use were
significantly higher in avoidance and inflexibility than those who responded to treatment.
In the second part to the study conducted by Kashdan and colleagues (2014) on social
phobia, participants were randomized to either a disclosure conversation in which the other
person disclosed something personal or a small talk conversation. High experiential avoidance
preceded greater anxiety in the disclosure conversation but not the small talk conversation
(Kashdan et al., 2014). Bardeen (2015) studied the relation between anxiety sensitivity,
experiential avoidance, and distress. He found that while anxiety sensitivity predicted anxiety
and post-traumatic stress symptoms for individuals with high experiential avoidance, during a
distressing task, anxiety sensitivity predicted greater distress only for individuals with low
experiential avoidance. This suggests that while there may be some short term benefits in the
form of relief when engaging in experiential avoidance, the long term consequences of
experiential avoidance may lead to increase in distress and symptoms (Bardeen, 2015). Taken
together, these studies illustrate that while experiential avoidance is generally associated with
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negative outcomes, it may function differently depending on the circumstances and the
timeframe investigated.
Several studies have also looked at behavioral avoidance in particular. Panayiotou,
Karekla, and Mete (2014) found that when looking at coping strategies, experiential avoidance,
and distress, behavioral engagement predicted distress. Other studies have found behavioral
avoidance mediates the link between rumination and depression for people who have
experienced loss (Eisma et al., 2013) and the relation between social anxiety and motives for
marijuana use (Buckner et al., 2014). Panayiotou, Karekla, and Panayiotou (2014) also found
that Behavioral inhibition directly predicted social anxiety.
Fusion, impulsivity, inflexible attention. While the bulk of the research on
psychological inflexibility related coping strategies has focused on experiential avoidance, newer
research has looked at other aspects of psychological inflexibility. Fergus (2015) found that
cognitive fusion was associated with health anxiety that was not attributable to anxiety
sensitivity, experiential avoidance, or negative affect. Trindade and Ferreira (2014) found that
fusion partially mediates the relationship between body dissatisfaction and eating
psychopathology in a sample of female college students. Similarly, Dinis and colleagues (2015)
found that fusion partially mediated the relationship between impact of childhood shame-related
experiences and experiential avoidance with respect to depression.
Koval and colleagues (2012) looked at rumination (inflexibility in thoughts) and
emotional inertia (a pattern of inflexibility in experience and expression of emotion) with respect
to depression. In this study, the researchers found that both predicted severity of depression
independently. Morrison and colleagues (2014) found that participants’ impulsive behavior on a
delay-discounting task was decreased by an acceptance intervention.
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Expressive suppression data. Several studies have looked at the effects of emotion
suppression as a naturally occurring coping strategy. Richards and Gross (2000) found that
participants who rate high on emotion suppression measures are less likely to remember
conversations and emotional experiences over a two-week period. Relatedly, Franchow and
Suchy (2015) found that individuals who rated high on expressive suppression performed more
poorly on processing speed and other executive functioning tasks. Gross and John (2003) also
found that high emotional suppression is positively correlated with depression, while also being
negatively correlated with life satisfaction, self-esteem, optimism, positive relations with others,
and self-acceptance. Moore, Zoellner, and Mollenholt (2008) found that emotional suppression
was linked to higher stress related symptoms overall and correlated with PTSD, anxiety, and
depression in a trauma exposed community sample, although this relationship was partially
mediated by rumination. Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Schweizer (2010) conducted a metaanalysis of coping strategies that found that suppression (combines both thought and expressive
suppression) was associated with higher rates of anxiety, depression, substance abuse, and
disordered eating, with effect sizes in the medium to large range. Kaplow and colleagues (2014)
found that emotional suppression mediated the relationship between adverse life events, suicide
attempts, and ideation for adolescents such that greater suppression predicted more suicidal
ideation and attempts.
Studies that have looked at induced expressive suppression have also found differences
with respect to physiological reactivity. Hoffman and colleagues (2009) showed that people who
are asked to engage in expressive suppression while engaging in an anxiety-provoking task have
a higher measured heart rate than those instructed to engage in reappraisal and acceptance. Other
studies have found that higher rates of autonomic arousal have also been found in participants

24

instructed to engage in expressive suppression when presented with disgusting (Gross 1998),
amusing, or sad stimuli (Gross & Levenson, 1997). In addition to the physiological responses,
studies have found lower ratings of amusement (Gross & Levenson, 1997), higher ratings of
anxiety (Hoffman et al., 2009), lower memory for movie content, as well as lower verbal
memory for high and low emotional stimuli (Richards & Gross, 2000). Matthies and colleagues
(2014) found that for adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, participants who were
instructed to engage in expressive suppression after a sadness mood induction remained sad
longer than those who were instructed to engage in acceptance.
Brummer, Stopa, and Bucks (2014) found differences with respect to age and the
relationship between suppression and distress, with the relationship between increased
suppression and higher distress only applied to younger participants. With older adults, there was
no relationship between suppression and distress.
Thought suppression data. Like expressive suppression and experiential avoidance, the
data on thought suppression suggest it is a maladaptive coping strategy. Studies have suggested
that thought suppression is less effective in a wide variety of settings than other coping strategies
such as acceptance and cognitive reappraisal. Marcks and Woods (2007) found that instructed
thought suppression was less effective than acceptance at decreasing intrusive thoughts.
Furthermore, thought suppression was correlated with anxiety, guilt, and perceived responsibility
with respect to the intrusive thought. In addition, people in the thought suppression group were
less willing to re-experience the distressing thoughts at the end of the study than those in the
acceptance group (Marcks & Woods, 2007). Hooper and colleagues (2011) found that people
with spider phobias in the instructed suppression group reported more anxiety than those in other
conditions after a behavioral activation task. Hooper and colleagues (2014) investigated the
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difference between defusion and thought suppression with respect to chocolate cravings and
consumption. Individuals in the thought suppression condition reported fewer cravings but ate
more chocolate during the taste test while the defusion group reporter more cravings but ate
fewer chocolates during taste test.
Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann (2006a) conducted a mood induction (using
a film clip) for participants who either did or did not meet criteria for mood and anxiety
disorders. Overall, higher levels of suppression were correlated with reports of more negative
emotions (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006a). McMullen (2008) found that
while individuals engaging in acceptance had an increase in pain tolerance despite no decrease in
pain ratings, those in the distraction group did not increase in tolerance. Other findings have
shown a similar pattern of results with panic disorder (Levitt, 2004) and pain tolerance
(Gutierrez et al., 2004; Hayes et al., 1999; Masedo & Esteve, 2007; Vowles et al., 2007). In a
repeated thought suppression study, Hooper and McHugh (2013b) found that participants who
were instructed to engage in repeated cycles of suppression and free-thinking phases experienced
sustained intrusion of the suppressed thought over time while those who engaged in suppression
once and then several phases of free thinking experienced a decline in the intrusion of the
suppressed thought.
Several studies have also explored thought suppression as a naturally occurring coping
strategy and the relation to psychological disorders, symptom severity, and distress. Marcks and
Woods (2005) also looked at naturally occurring acceptance and suppression. The researchers
concluded that people who suppress thoughts “have more of the thoughts, [are] more distressed
by such thoughts, and have a greater ‘urge to do something about’ the thoughts” (p. 443). Barnes
and colleagues (2013) found that for individuals who are obese and have binge eating disorder,
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higher levels of food thought suppression were associated with higher levels of disordered eating
psychopathology although not associated with higher instances of binge eating or a greater BMI.
Garland and Roberts-Lewis (2013) found that suppression was related to both post-traumatic
stress symptom severity and higher cravings for substances while dispositional mindfulness
predicted decreased suppression, post-traumatic stress symptoms, and cravings. Collins and
colleagues (2014) found that for college students who had recently experienced a sexual assault,
engagement in thought suppression moderated the relationship between sexual assault and
disordered eating, with those who engage in high levels of suppression reporting higher levels of
disordered eating.
Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema (2010) found that overall suppression and rumination were
highly associated with anxiety, depression, and eating disordered symptoms. A meta-analysis
conducted by Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, and Schweizer found a medium to large effect sizes for
suppression when looking at symptoms of anxiety, depression, substance use, and eating (2010).
Several studies also indicate that thought suppression may be a key component of ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder (Olaffson et al., 2014; Harsanyi et al., 2014; Pfalz et al., 2015). Overall,
the data suggests that both instructed thought suppression and thought suppression as a
spontaneous coping strategy are associated with negative outcomes. However, the relationship
between thought suppression as a spontaneous coping strategy and severity of naturally
occurring stressors as it relates to general psychological functioning has not been studied.
Interaction of Different Stressors and Coping Strategies
Research suggests that coping strategies associated with psychological flexibility lead to
better outcomes, while those associated with psychological inflexibility typically do not.
Researchers have investigated whether the presence or absence of coping strategies associated
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with the model affect distress and functioning. However, these studies have not investigated the
relationship between severity of stressor and coping strategy and their effect on distress. In a
pilot study, we sought to investigate this relationship.
Preliminary Studies
Prevalence Data
In order to explore the prevalence of psychologically flexible and inflexible coping
strategies, preliminary survey data were collected at a major university in the Southeastern
United States (Schnetzer, Flynn, Kellum, & Wilson, 2012). The questions covered several
coping strategies that are often discussed in the literature as strategies consistent with
psychological flexibility as well as inflexible strategies such as distraction, suppression,
medication use, and avoidance. In this study, participants were prompted to write a brief
narrative about a recent stressful experience and indicate whether they had engaged in specific
coping strategies.
Pilot study
Methods. A pilot study used the prevalence of coping strategy data to investigate the
relations between coping and severity of stressor. The prevalence dataset did not include severity
of stressor ratings for the narratives. Therefore, the narratives were assigned severity of stressor
scores using a secondary method that involved coding the narratives by category and then
obtaining severity of stressor scores by having undergraduates rate the categories then compute
average scores to determine the severity score.
Results. Once severity scores were computed and assigned to the narratives, regression
analyses were run to determine the relations between severity of stressor and coping strategy as it
relates to psychological distress. Although five of the regression models indicated statistically
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significant main effects for coping strategy (behavioral engagement, alcohol use, prescription
drug use, over-the-counter medication use, and positive thinking), the effect sizes for the
regressions were small, suggesting that the relations between coping and distress were negligible.
Limitations of Pilot Study
Given the well-established findings that engagement in flexible or inflexible coping
reliably affects psychological distress in ways consistent with the model, our preliminary results
suggested two potential explanations. One explanation is that the relationship between these
coping strategies and distress did not hold in this population. It is also possible that the
limitations in our study threatened the validity of the inferences that could be made from the pilot
analyses. The limitations include, but are not limited to, restriction of range in severity of stressor
ratings, issues with narrative content, utility of the format of coping strategy questions, and
validity of the item content.
Severity of Stressor Ratings and Restriction of Range
There were two potential limitations of using computed severity of stressor scores that
were addressed in the current study. Because severity of stressor was calculated by computing
the average of severity of stressor ratings, these weighted severity scores may not have
accurately reflected the perceived severity of stress of each individual. In other words, even
though two people may write about distress related to an upcoming exam, one participant may
not perceive the exam to be as stressful as another participant would perceive it.
There was also a problem with restricted range of severity of stressors. Approximately
80% of the sample had a score between 6.07 and 8.90 (on a scale of 1 to 10), which indicates a
severe restriction of range within the severity scores. The pilot data made it difficult to ascertain
whether the results accurately reflected the relationship between severity of stressor and distress
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given that there was a limited range of severity of stressor scores. When no low severity events
are present in the dataset, our ability to analyze the relationship at that level of stressor was
limited.
Narrative concerns
Participants were instructed to “think about a specific stressful event you experienced
recently.” However, “recently” was not operationally defined as a specific period of time in
which the experience should have occurred. While some narratives described events that had
happened in the weeks prior to data collection, details from other narratives indicated that the
stressful events had occurred more than 6 months prior to the experiment. We would predict that
there would be a more direct impact on current distress from a stressor that was more recent than
one that happened in the distant past.
Coping Item Utility
One of the limitations of the coping strategy items is that the previous items only ask
whether the person used the strategy in a yes/no response format. While this is a useful tool for
measuring prevalence, this type of responding does not capture the amount of variability that
may exist with regards to the frequency of coping strategy use. The data have no measure of how
frequently each coping item was used overall or in relation to one another. Participants may
appear identical in their coping strategy use based on this data but actually may be vastly
different in how they cope. For example, two participants could endorse using behavioral
engagement and distraction. One person may rely primarily on behavioral engagement, while
another may rely primarily on distraction. Given that the two strategies are conceptually
different, the amount of time one spends using each strategy may lead to differences in distress.
If someone primarily uses psychologically flexible coping strategies, he may have less distress
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than someone who primarily uses psychologically inflexible coping strategies. However, we
could not address this difference with the previous data.
Fit with the Psychological Flexibility Model
One of the most important methodological concerns regarding the pilot comes from the
language of the coping items. The original question items were not created for the study, and as
such may be limited. A conceptual rationale was given as to why each item may represent
psychologically flexible or inflexible coping strategies. However, it is possible that the items did
not accurately represent the constructs they are designed to measure. For example, for some
participants, use of prescription medication may reflect committed action rather than experiential
avoidance if their stressor was an illness that required them to take medication. Below is a brief
summary of the original coping items used in the pilot data and the conceptual concerns with
each.
Mindfulness and Acceptance items. In the pilot study, researchers conceptualized the
following items from the survey as mindfulness and acceptance items: “I noticed my thoughts
and feelings and did not attempt to change them” and “I was open to whatever thoughts and
feelings came up even if they were unpleasant.” The two items mainly rely on the concepts of
noticing and openness to experience to evaluate mindfulness processes. Although these
statements contain words such as “notice” and “open” which are often used to define
mindfulness and acceptance, they may not fully describe what is meant by mindfulness or touch
upon all the processes associated with mindfulness and acceptance within the psychological
flexibility model.
For example, the second statement indicates that the participant “noticed [his] thoughts
and feelings and did not attempt to change them.” Noticing, from a mindfulness perspective,
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means “to be aware of.” However, participants may have interpreted the statement to mean
something more like rumination. Neither statement directly indicates that the thoughts and
feelings were not held tightly in awareness for an extended period of time. In theory, a person
could notice his thoughts, be open to the experience, and not try to change them, while still
holding tightly to the experience and content of the thoughts and feelings. The coping statements
also do not directly address contact with the present moment or the nonjudgmental nature of
acceptance. Because these components of mindfulness are not specified in the statements, it is
difficult to know whether participants who endorse these items intend them in the way that the
researchers hypothesized.
Behavior Change-Related Coping Strategy Items. The following items were originally
conceptualized as behavior change related coping strategy items: “I searched for meaning in the
experience” and “I did something that was difficult/uncomfortable because it was important for
me to do so.” However, there are limitations to this interpretation of the items as discussed
below.
“I searched for meaning in the experience.” This coping strategy was initially
conceptualized as a values-related coping strategy. However, an affirmative response to this item
could also represent avoidance of negative thoughts and feelings associated with the experience.
The function of connecting meaning to the experience would differ. In this case, a person may
wish to ascribe meaning to a situation to lessen uncomfortable feelings about a stressful
situation. In that situation, the search for meaning would function as inflexible coping rather than
flexible coping.
“I did something that was difficult/uncomfortable because it was important for me to
do so.” This item was conceptualized as representing commitment and behavior change
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processes. However, it does not specify if the importance of the behavior was due to the
participant’s internally held values or for external reasons. Committed action requires the
intentional choice of engaging in a behavior for the service of a person’s own values. Because
valued action is not linked to outcome, the behavior may be important and function as avoidance
(i.e., important to escape consequence), which would be considered an inflexible strategy.
Psychological Inflexibility-related Coping Strategy Items. The following items were
conceptualized as being consistent with psychological inflexibility. There are conceptual issues
with some of the items as discussed below. Although the data did not indicate expected relations
between coping and distress, several items regarding illicit drug/alcohol use, suppression, and
distraction were not considered to have conceptual issues.
Prescription/over-the-counter medication use items. Because the conceptual issue with
these items is similar, they are combined in this analysis. Both prescription and over-the-counter
medication use were conceptualized as representing psychological inflexibility because they can
serve to alter experience in a way that would allow for avoidance of uncomfortable thoughts and
feelings. However, if someone’s stressor is a medical illness, taking medication to cope with that
stressor could represent valued action. For example, if a participant wrote about being diagnosed
with a disease such as type I diabetes, then using insulin (a prescription medication) might be in
service of staying healthy.
“I used alcohol or other drugs (not prescribed) to help myself get through it.” This item
was conceptualized as functioning as an inflexible coping strategy. While drug and alcohol use
in itself is not necessarily an avoidant strategy (e.g. recreation), use of these substances with
respect to coping cannot be conceptualized as anything other than inflexible, avoidant coping. In
the pilot data, this item accounted for more variance in distress than any of the other coping
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items, and the relationship was in the expected direction, suggesting that it does represent
inflexible coping.
“I tried to think positive thoughts.” Attempting to think positive thoughts can also be
conceptualized as thought suppression. Trying to think positive thoughts may involve intentional
attempts to change the content of thoughts from negative/unpleasant ones (aversive private
events) to positive/pleasant thoughts. This process suggests an attachment to conceptualized self,
(“I am someone who thinks happy thoughts/must be happy”) and fusion (e.g. “thinking negative
thoughts is bad, and they must be changed). Hooper and McHugh (2013a) used changing
negative thoughts to positive thoughts as a thought distraction exercise. Furthermore, there is
some evidence that positive self-statements in certain contexts (e.g. low self-esteem) can have a
negative impact (Wood, Perunovic, & Lee, 2009). However, the item does not explain what
positive thinking as a psychologically inflexible coping strategy means. While engagement in
positive thinking may reflect thought suppression as conceptualized above, it may also be the
case that what some participants indicated as thinking positive thoughts functioned to increase
psychological flexibility. For example, if a person is thinking, “I am stupid” but then thinks, “I
am sometimes intelligent,” this may serve to loosen the rigid beliefs that a person has about
himself, which may function more like defusion.
Ignoring/Not Thinking/Distraction. The items “I tried not to think about it/ignored it,”
and “I did something to think about it less, such as going to the movies, watching TV, reading,
daydreaming, sleeping, or shopping,” were conceptualized as psychologically inflexible coping
via thought suppression, which is the active attempt to avoid thoughts (Wegner, 1989). These
items indicated attempts to avoid particular thoughts via the wording “tried not to think about it,”
“ignored it,” and “did something to think about it less.” Thought suppression can be
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conceptualized as a form of experiential avoidance in that it functions to avoid the unpleasant
experience of these thoughts.
“I was careful not to let my feelings show.” This item was conceptualized as
representing expressive suppression, which can function as a form of psychologically inflexible
coping. Expressive suppression can be conceptualized as experiential avoidance and also
involves a narrowing of the behavioral repertoire associated with fusion.
Conceptualization of Updated Coping Items
Psychologically Flexible Coping Items
“I noticed my thoughts and feelings and did not attempt to change them or push them
away.” The statement uses the verb notice, which means “to become aware of” (Oxford
University Press, 2013). This invokes acceptance by its deliberate absence of judgment toward
the thoughts and feelings. Acceptance is further expressed in this item by “not attempt[ing] to
change [the thoughts and feelings],” which demonstrates willingness to have an experience.
Noticing also invokes contact with the present moment by the act of attending to a part of an
experience at a particular moment.
“I stayed open to thoughts and feelings even if they were unpleasant.” This item
represents the concept of openness to experience as defined in mindfulness processes. In this
item, there is a willingness to have unpleasant experiences without attempting to remove them as
evidenced by the openness to experience even if thoughts and feelings were “unpleasant,” which
is a core feature of mindfulness and acceptance processes (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p.
77). Staying open to experience indicates flexible, focused, intentional attention as defined by
contact with the present moment. It also indicates defusion processes may be at work. Because
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defusion involves letting go of thoughts that cause us to get stuck, taking an open posture toward
our internal experience indicates a lack of attachment to those thoughts.
“I did not judge my thoughts and feelings even if they were unpleasant.” This coping
statement attempts to directly address the nonjudgmental nature of mindfulness processes. The
previous coping items did not explicitly include taking a non-judgmental posture toward one’s
internal experience although it is a core component of some definitions of mindfulness (Baer et
al, 2006). Actively letting go of judgment involves contact with the present moment, as it
requires attention and intention. Being willing to engage with unpleasant thoughts and feelings
indicates acceptance. The nonjudgmental stance also includes defusion. Because defusion
involves looking at one’s internal experience as “ongoing mental activity” rather becoming
stuck, this requires a nonjudgmental stance toward internal experiences (Hayes, Strosahl, &
Wilson, 2011).
“I was able to experience my thoughts and feelings without getting stuck in them.”
This item attempts to address the flexibility of awareness as seen in contact with the present
moment and defusion. Contact with the present moment involves attending to one’s experience
with intention and involves both flexibility in attention and focus (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson,
2011). The ability to stay flexible within the experience is invoked by “without getting stuck” in
the thoughts and feelings. This also represents defusion processes within the model. Defusion,
within the model, is defined as “enabl[ing] the individual to let go of needless entanglement with
distressing, unwanted private events and experiences and to view them in a nonjudgmental way
as merely ongoing mental activity.” (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011, p. 68). This is directly
addressed within the item by focusing on not getting “stuck” in the experience of thoughts and
feelings.
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“I did something that was difficult/uncomfortable because it was connected to
something I care about.” The item involves engaging in a particular behavior that was
“difficult” or “uncomfortable.” This implies a willingness to engage in situations in which
unpleasant thoughts and feelings occur. The item also demonstrates committed action because
the action was “important” or valued from the perspective of the actor. One commonly used
ACT metaphor, the swamp metaphor, demonstrates this willingness to contact unpleasant stimuli
in the presence of values-directed behavior. In the metaphor, the client imagines he is hiking to a
mountain in the distance with a swamp between him and the mountain. He can choose to
continue through the swamp, which is unpleasant, or abandon the trip and never see the
mountain (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999, p. 247-248). The choice to continue through the
swamp represents the choice to continue on a valued direction even in the presence of difficulty
and discomfort.
“I was able to learn something meaningful from the experience.” Viewing an
experience from the context of what is meaningful allows it to be connected to a value or set of
values. Viktor Frankl, in his book Man’s Search for Meaning, describes his choice to remain in a
concentration camp to care for his dying patients despite the opportunity to escape. He does so
because he finds meaning in his experience (Frankl, 1992).
“I kept in mind what matters to me (for example: family, friends, education).” This
item is conceptualized as a present moment focus on values. Within the psychological flexibility
model, connecting with values allows individuals to engage with reinforcers in values-directed
behaviors. Being present to one’s own values can allow for individuals to access those
reinforcers as well as serve as motivation for values-driven behaviors.
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“I connected my experience to the things that I value.” This item also represents a
conceptualization of values. In this item, individuals endorse connecting their experience to their
values. This item also indicates present moment focus within valued domains. Connecting
experience to values requires flexible, focused attention on both experience and what the
individual values.
Psychologically Inflexible Coping Items
Prescription Medication Use/Prescription Medication Overuse/Alcohol & Other
Drugs/Tobacco/Over-the-Counter Medication. Five items deal with substance use as a coping
strategy. These include “I took my prescribed medication to help myself cope with difficult
thoughts and feelings”, “I overused prescription medication or took a medication that was not
prescribed to me to cope with difficult thoughts and feelings”, “I used alcohol or recreational
drugs (not prescribed) to help myself cope with difficult thoughts and feelings”, “I used tobacco
or nicotine products to help myself cope with difficult thoughts and feelings,” and “I took a
medication purchased over-the counter (not requiring a prescription) to help myself cope.”
These items conceptually represent psychological inflexibility because they can serve to alter
experience in a way that would allow for avoidance of uncomfortable thoughts and feelings.
Several studies have found a link between experiential avoidance and substance use (Buckner et
al., 2014; Bordieri et al., 2014; Levin et al., 2012). Items have been altered from the original
substance use items to specifically indicate that they are used for coping with difficult thoughts
and feelings. While the use of substances in itself is not necessarily an avoidant strategy (e.g.
recreation, medical necessity), use of these substances with respect to coping cannot be
conceptualized as anything other than inflexible, avoidant coping. In addition, items were added
to represent overuse of medication and use of tobacco or nicotine products
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“I tried not to think about it” and “I ignored it.” These items theoretically involve
psychological inflexibility via thought suppression, which is the active attempt to avoid thoughts
(Wegner, 1989). In studies related to thought suppression, participants who are instructed to
engage in suppression more frequently recall the suppressed thought than those who are not
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Because the focus in thought suppression is on
avoiding a particular thought, the ability to flexibly attend can be compromised. Engagement in
thought suppression also suggests an unwillingness to experience aversive thoughts. CampbellSills, Barlow, Brown, and Hofmann found evidence that the relationship between thought
suppression and negative outcomes is mediated by the appraisal of negative emotions as
unacceptable (i.e. fusion), (2006a).
“I did something to distract myself from thinking about it (for example: watching TV,
sleeping, shopping, etc.)” This item represents psychological inflexibility because the item
indicates the function of the behaviors directly. Distraction can be conceptualized as a form of
experiential avoidance, in that distraction functions to avoid the unpleasant experience of these
thoughts. The avoidance of unpleasant experience is evidenced by “[doing] something to think
about [the stressful event] less”. This also indicates a lack of committed action through
impulsivity and inaction. These behaviors do not serve a particular valued area of living. Instead,
they function as an avoidance strategy. For example, a person could sleep to engage in the value
of self-care because they are not sleeping enough. However, in this situation, sleeping serves to
remove the self from an aversive situation rather than in service of a valued domain of living.
“I made up reasons in order to feel better.” This item was generated to differentiate
focusing on meaning/reasons as an avoidant strategy versus connecting one’s experience to a
deeply held value. Making reasons to feel better may indicate that the person was attempting to
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avoid the negative thoughts and feelings associated with the experience by replacing it with a
positive reason for the experience to have occurred. This would be more in line with what is
conceptualized as avoidant strategies. Although not directly stated, this item may include fusion
in addition to avoidance and unwillingness to experience difficult internal experiences. For
example, thoughts about how one should feel (i.e. better) and that there should be reasons for our
experiences in life may underlie a person’s desire to create reasons to feel better.
“I was careful not to let my feelings show.” This item is an example of expressive
suppression and was not changed from the original coping items. Expressive suppression
involves masking outward, physical expressions of emotion such as face expressions and body
language (Gross, 1998). This masking of physical expressions of emotion can be conceptualized
as the narrowing of behaviors associated with fusion. Expressive suppression can also be
conceptualized as experiential avoidance although it differs from thought suppression in that
there is no explicit instruction to suppress the cognitive content. While it is not explicitly stated,
suppression of emotions may be associated with the belief that showing emotions is not
acceptable, and thus an example of fusion.
Current Study
The purpose of the current study was to further examine the relations between coping
strategies and severity of stressors through the lens of an empirically supported, comprehensive
theoretical model. Given the limitations of the pilot study, this study sought to address the
restriction of range, to clarify the narrative content, and to improve the fit of the coping strategy
items to the model.
It was predicted that severity of stressor would predict psychological distress such that
higher severity of stressor scores would positively predict higher levels of psychological distress.
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We hypothesized that more engagement in flexible coping would negatively predict
psychological distress. We also hypothesized that higher rated frequency of engagement in
inflexible coping strategies would positively predict psychological distress. Finally, we
hypothesized that coping strategy would moderate the relation between severity of stressor and
distress such that there would be a positive relation between severity of stressor and
psychological distress for individuals who endorsed high levels of inflexible coping. However,
for individuals who endorsed high levels of flexible coping, the relation between severity of
stressor and psychological distress will be of lesser magnitude.
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II. PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS
In the pilot study, individual coping strategy statements and severity of stressor ratings
were used to determine whether endorsement of coping strategies moderated the relationship
between severity of stressor and predicted psychological distress. The coping study questions in
the pilot study did not identify how frequently participants engaged in each coping strategy. In
addition, each coping strategy was examined individually. In our current study, we are interested
in using groups of coping strategy items rather than individual items to run the analyses because
people may engage in several coping strategies that are related. To this end, a principal
components analysis was conducted to determine if the revised coping strategy statements load
onto the components in ways that are consistent with the psychological flexibility model of
coping.
Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate Psychology classes at the University of
Mississippi. Participants were given credit for participation through the online participant
recruiting system used for psychology classes at the university, Sona System. Based on a-priori
power analyses for hierarchical regression with two variables in the first step and one variable in
the second, a minimum of 387 participants are needed for adequate power for detecting a smallsized effect (f2 = .02 ) with alpha level set at .05. We chose small effect size given that previous
meta-analyses of the data indicate a small effect size for acceptance-based coping
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strategies (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, Schweizer, 2010; Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes,
2012a). The survey was active for one semester. Recruitment yielded 569 participants in the data
collection process. Of the 569 participants, one participant did not complete demographic
information for gender, ethnicity, education, and country of origin. Of the 568 participants who
did complete the demographic questions, 367 participants (64.6%) identified as female.
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 30 (M =19.55). Caucasian students made up the majority of
participants (76.4%). African-American students were 15.8%, Asian students 2.1%, Hispanic
3.5%, and 2.1% identifying as other. The majority of students were freshmen (60.9%) and 2.8%
of participants were international students.
Procedure
After recruitment and following their consent, participants filled out a brief demographics
questionnaire (Appendix A). After completing the demographics survey, participants were asked
to write a brief narrative about a recent stressful event (Appendix B). They were then asked to
answer questions related to coping strategies they used with respect to the stressful event they
reported (Appendix B). After completing the stressor narrative and coping strategy items,
participants were prompted via Qualtrics to fill out the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21
(DASS-21) to measure psychological distress (Appendix C).
Measures
Coping strategy items. Schnetzer, Flynn, Kellum, and Wilson (2012) created several
coping strategy statements to explore the prevalence of different ways of coping. There were
originally 17 items that covered psychologically flexible coping, psychologically inflexible
coping, and other methods of coping such as help seeking and turning to religious beliefs.
Participants were instructed to write a brief narrative of a recent stressful event and then asked to
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answer “yes” or “no” as to whether they had used the stated coping strategies in dealing with that
stressor.
A total of 558 undergraduates who were enrolled in psychology courses completed the
prevalence data collection process. The majority of participants were female (68.6%) and
Caucasian (78.1%). Age ranged from 17 to 38 years of age, with the mean age as 18.9.
Items conceptualized as psychological flexibility consistent strategies were endorsed by
between 67% and 34.8% of the sample. Acceptance related strategy endorsement ranged from
67% (letting go) to 34.8% (noticing experience). Valued action items were endorsed at 63.4%
(seeking meaning) to 50.9% (behavioral engagement).
Endorsement of strategies inconsistent with the psychological flexibility model ranged
from 88.8% to 6.5%. Strategies that indicated attempts to change or suppress cognitive content
ranged from 88.8% (think positive thoughts) to 51.6% (ignore thoughts). Still other strategies,
such as prescription medication use, drug and alcohol use, and over the counter medication use,
were endorsed at the lowest rates at 11%, 14.6%, and 6.5% respectively.
The coping strategy items in the current study were adapted from the previous coping
items generated by Schnetzer and colleagues (2012). Following the severity of stressor rating,
participants were asked to indicate how much they utilized particular coping strategies for this
stressful event with the following prompt: “Think about the situation you have just described,
and how you reacted to it. Then indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 how frequently you did each of the
following, with 1 being ‘not at all’ and 7 being ‘very frequently’.” Eighteen separate coping
strategy items were then presented (Appendix B).
Changes in wording were made in an attempt to address the methodological concerns
posed above. Of the eleven items that were used in the pilot study (Appendix D), ten have been
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modified in their wording to either clarify the meaning of the item or to include the function of
the behavior described. For example, the item worded “I did something that was
difficult/uncomfortable because it was important for me to do so” was changed to better reflect
the function of the behavior. The new item states, “I did something that was
difficult/uncomfortable because it was connected to something I care about.” Seven items have
been added to the coping items to measure constructs within these processes that were not
directly measured previously. An example of a new item is, “I did not judge my thoughts and
feelings even if they were unpleasant.” This item reflects an aspect of mindfulness and
acceptance processes (non-judgment) that was not explicitly stated in the previous items.
Statistical Analysis Strategy
Data were downloaded from Qualtrics into an SPSS file. Demographic data were
analyzed using descriptive statistics. Prior to analyses, the severity of stressor rating dataset
was screened for missing data and outliers.
At least one severity rating was missing for 20 participants (3.5%). A missing values
analysis using Little’s Missing Completely At Random (MCAR) test suggested that the data
were missing completely at random (χ2 (603, N = 569) = 614.28, p < .366). Since the data are
considered MCAR, traditional missing data techniques, such as listwise deletion, may be used
(Enders, 2010; Acock, 2012); however, the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm, a variant
of maximum likelihood estimation (Dempster, Laird, & Rubin, 1977), was used to estimate the
missing values. Enders (2010) indicates that even when data are MCAR, the maximum
likelihood estimate method is less likely to introduce bias in the sample and increases the
statistical power of the analyses (p. 87). EM is comprised of two steps that are repeated until they
converge. The E-step uses the existing parameter estimates to create a set of regression equations
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that predict the incomplete variables. This is followed by the M-step, which incorporates the
estimated data with the complete data to compute new parameter estimates. These new parameter
estimates are then used in the E-step to update the regression equations to predict the incomplete
variables. The E and M steps are repeated in sequence until they converge to produce the most
likely estimates of the missing variables.
Of the 569 participants who completed the survey, 94 participants (16.5% of the original
sample) were removed due to incorrectly answering the bogus item. This data shows a somewhat
higher rate of the population as identified as careless responders based on Meade’s and Craig’s
finding that between 10 and 12 percent of the student population was identified as careless
responders using various methods of detection including bogus items (Meade & Craig, 2012).
An assessment of the normality of the variables needed for analyses were conducted by
examining the skew and kurtosis via SPSS. Z-scores were calculated for the skew and kurtosis to
examine whether they were significantly non-normal. Results indicate that of the 18 coping
strategy items and the severity of stressor item, seven of the items were statistically significantly
skewed (|z| ≥ 3.29, p < .001). However, since principal components analysis does not require
normality of variables as an assumption, the items were not transformed.
Univariate and multivariate outlier analyses were conducted to identify outliers within the
dataset. Among the 475 remaining participants, 47 cases (9.89%) were identified as containing
univariate outlying values (|z| ≥ 3.29, p < .001) on study variables. However, these cases involve
variables that are highly skewed. Given that the distributions for these variables are significantly
non-normal and that z-scores reflect outliers in a normal distribution, z-scores may not accurately
reflect outliers in this dataset. In addition, these cases reflect participants with high scores on
endorsing substance use items. Therefore, removing these cases from the analyses would
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essentially eliminate all participants who endorse OTC medication use or overusing medication;
thus, they were retained in the dataset. An analysis of multivariate outliers found 25 cases
(5.26%) among the remaining participants with a Mahalanobis distance exceeding the critical
value (D2 (19, N = 475) > 43.82, p < .001). These cases were removed from subsequent
analyses.
A PCA was conducted to determine how the coping strategy items group together. The
current dataset had a sample size (N = 450) that exceeds the criteria suggested by Meyers,
Gamst, & Guarino (2013), who suggest researchers should aim for a target ratio of 20
participants per variable.
Data were also visually checked for homoscedasticity and linearity. Given the large
number of items and possible combinations, items with the greatest skew were visually checked.
While the visual inspection indicates that there may be some heteroscedasticity, there was no
evidence of a curvilinear relationship between the variables.
Factorability of the data was also assessed. Of the 18 initial coping strategy items, 16
items were correlated at or above .3 with at least one other variable, and many of the correlations
were significant, which suggests the data set is factorable (See Appendix E for the complete
correlation matrix). Furthermore, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy yielded
a result of .732; Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) indicate that values of .6 and above are required
for factorability (p.620). Finally, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity tests the null hypothesis that the
correlation matrix reveals that none of the items are correlated. Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was
significant (χ2 (153) = 1666.70, p < .01), which indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected.
While Tabachnick and Fidell (2012) indicate that Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity may be overly
sensitive to a large N, taken together, these tests indicate that the data are factorable.
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Results
The initial analysis extracted factors based on eigenvalues greater than 1. This analysis
yielded five factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. A parallel analysis was then completed
using the “Parallel Analysis Engine to Aid Determining Number of Factors to Retain” to
determine how many factors to retain (Patil, Singh, Mishra, & Donovan, 2007). In a parallel
analysis, a random dataset is created with the same number of variables and participants as the
original dataset. Then, a principal components analysis is run on the random data and
eigenvalues are reported. This is run repeatedly and the average of the eigenvalues is reported.
Only components whose eigenvalues are greater than those generated by random data are
retained. While five components in the data of interest generated eigenvalues greater than 1, only
four eigenvalues were greater than those generated by the parallel analysis (Table 1). Therefore,
four components were retained for subsequent analyses. The four components retained account
for 49.23% of the total variance in the dataset. The percentage of variance accounted for by the
individual components ranged from 13.35% to 11.90% of the variance (Table 2).
Table 1. Eigenvalues for Coping Strategy Data and Parallel Analysis
Coping Data
Component
1
2
3
4
5

Eigenvalue
3.30
2.30
1.98
1.28
1.08

Parallel Analysis
Component Eigenvalue
1
1.37
2
1.29
3
1.24
4
1.19
5
1.15

Table 2. Percent Variance and Covariance for each of the Rotated Components

Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
Component 4

SSLs
2.40
2.17
2.15
2.14

% of Variance
13.35
12.04
11.95
11.90

Cumulative %
13.35
25.39
37.34
49.23
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% of Covariance
27.09
24.49
24.27
24.15

Cumulative %
27.09
51.58
75.85
100.00

An oblique rotation of the components was performed using a direct oblimin rotation to
determine if an oblique or orthogonal rotation best fit the data. Tabachnick and Fidell (2013)
argue that if the correlation among components is .32 or above, an oblique rotation may be
warranted (p. 651). Correlations ranged from .086 to -.241. Given that correlations do not
exceed .32, an orthogonal rotation is warranted. A PCA was then run using a cut-off of four
components and an orthogonal varimax rotation.
Table 3. Rotated Component Matrix for Coping Strategy Items
Components
1
2
3
4 Communality
.65
NonJudge
.16
-.05 .08
.78
.50
Notice
.69 <.01 .06 -.13
.47
Open
.65 -.13 <.01 .18
.44
Experience
.03
-.07 .26
.61
.36
Difficult Values
.13
.30
.50 -.05
.66
Ignore
.04
-.01 -.10
.80
.66
Distract
-.07 .78
.09
.18
.62
Not Think
<.01 .77
-.03 .14
.27
Reasons
.11
.33
.22
.31
.62
Overuse Meds
-.03 -.06
.79 -.05
.51
OTC Meds
.03
.04
.71 -.06
.41
Alc/Drugs
.07
.23
.60 -.03
.35
Rx Meds
-.14 -.07
.13
.56
.30
Tobacco
.10
.01
.08
.53
.62
Values1
.04
.16 <.01 .77
.67
Values2
.39 -.02
.03
.72
.57
LearnMeaning
.26 -.03 <.01 .71
.21
Suppress Emo
-.04 .26
.02
.37
Cronbach’s Alpha
(α 
.68
.74
.54
.72
When determining which items to retain for a component, Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino
(2013) suggest using a cut-off of approximately .40 component loading although they warn that
using less than .5 may reduce reliability of the component. The Rotated Component Matrix
revealed the four components that consist of three to five items each (Table 3). Two items, “I am
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careful to not let my feelings show” and “I made up reasons in order to feel better,” did not load
above the cutoff of .50 for any of the components.
Component Labels and Consistency
For the purposes of this study, Component 1 is labeled as Mindfulness and Engagement.
Items in this component involve mindfulness processes and committed action. These items
include focusing on openness to one’s experience, noticing experience, non-judgmental stance,
experiencing without getting stuck, and engaging in difficult behaviors. All of the items reflect
aspects of psychological flexibility.
Component 2 was labeled as psychological inflexibility and is conceptualized as
psychological inflexible coping. The items that load onto this component include not thinking
about the stressor, distracting oneself from the stressor, and ignoring thoughts and feelings.
These items theoretically represent thought suppression and distraction as described above, both
of which are conceptualized as psychological inflexible coping strategies.
Component 3 is labeled Substance Use because these items are similar in content (use of
substances for coping). These items were conceptualized as representing psychological
inflexibility because the use of substances to cope with thoughts and feelings indicates
experiential avoidance. In the pilot data, related items were conceptualized as functioning as
inflexible coping strategies. In the pilot data, those items accounted for more variance in distress
than any of the other coping items, and the relationship was in the expected direction, suggesting
that it did represent inflexible coping strategies. Due to both the theoretical analysis of the use of
substances to cope with thoughts and feelings as avoidance and to the previous data indicating
that these strategies represent psychologically inflexible coping strategies, this component is
consistent with the theoretical model.
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Component 4 was labeled as Present Values and is conceptualized as containing items
that involve engaging values in the present moment. Each of the items that load onto this
component was conceptualized as primarily involving values as defined by psychological
flexibility. They also involve being present to those values and connecting them to one’s
experiences. As such, this component is conceptually consistent with aspects of psychological
flexibility.
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for each component to determine the internal
consistency for each component. Cronbach’s alpha scores ranged from acceptable (Psychological
Inflexibility, α = .74) to poor (Substance use, α = .54) (Table 3). Given that the obtained
components are interpretable within the context of the psychological flexibility model, sum
scores will be computed for each component to be used in the hierarchical regression analyses.
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III. IMPACT OF SEVERITY OF STRESSORS AND COPING ON DISTRESS
The current study investigates whether severity of stressor predicts psychological
distress, as measured by the DASS-21, such that greater severity of stressor indicates greater
psychological distress. Furthermore, it investigates whether the endorsement of psychologically
flexible and inflexible coping strategies predict psychological distress. Finally, we examine
whether there is a significant interaction between severity of stressor and coping strategy when
predicting psychological distress.
Methods
Participants and Procedures. Participants for this study were the same as the previous study
(see above).
Measures
Severity of Stressor Rating. In the pilot study cited previously, severity of stressor
ratings were created by coding the narratives and having undergraduates rate those categories on
a scale of 1 to 10. In the current study, participants were prompted to write briefly about a recent
stressful experience with the following prompt: “Think about a specific event you experienced in
the past 2 weeks that was frustrating or stressful. Describe this event in the box below. Be sure to
include the following details: where it took place, who was involved, and what made this event
frustrating/stressful.” Following the completion of the narrative, participants were then asked to
indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 how stressful they thought the particular event was with the
following prompt: “Take a few moments to think about the most stressful experience you’ve ever
had. Now, with that in mind, think about the stressful event you wrote about and rate it on a scale
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of 1 to 10 as to how stressful that event was, with 1 being ‘not at all stressful’ and 10 being
‘extremely stressful/the most stressful thing I’ve experienced’.”
Coping Strategy Components. Several questions were developed to assess participant
endorsement of coping strategies based on a particular stressful event as described in the
Principal Components methods. Eighteen separate coping strategy items were presented and
participants were asked to rate how frequently they engaged in each strategy on a scale of 1 to 7
(Appendix B). A principal components analysis was conducted to determine if the coping items
combine to create components that can be interpreted within the theoretical framework of
psychological flexibility. As presented above, the PCA indicated that there were four
components that range from 3 to 5 items per component. Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the
components to determine the internal consistency for each component. Cronbach’s alpha scores
ranged from acceptable (Psychological Inflexibility, α = .74) to poor (Substance Use, α = .54)
(Table 3). Sum scores were computed for each component by adding each item within that
component. The sum scores are used in the regression analyses to represent engagement in
different coping strategies.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21. Psychological distress was assessed by the 21item Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21
was developed as a short form of the 42-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS). The
DASS-21 was originally conceptualized and analyzed as a measure with three separate, yet
related scales of depression, anxiety, and stress (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). However, a more
recent analysis indicates that a more accurate conceptualization of the DASS-21 is that the
optimal model of factors includes a general psychological distress factor as well as three
underlying factors of depression, anxiety, and stress (Henry & Crawford, 2005). The total score
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and subscale scores have good reliability (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Henry
& Crawford, 2005). The DASS-21 also has adequate convergent and divergent validity (Antony,
Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Henry & Crawford, 2005).
The DASS-21 is traditionally scored by computing a sum score for each scale. The
Depression scale is comprised of items 3, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 21. The Anxiety scale uses items
2, 4, 7, 9, 15, 19, and 20. Items 1, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, and 18 comprise the Stress scale. Each scale
score is then multiplied by 2 in order to create scores similar to that of the DASS. However, in
light of the fact that the items load strongly onto a single factor conceptualized as general
psychological distress, for the purposes of this study a total score will be computed by summing
all items together and multiplying by 2. In the current dataset, the DASS-21 was found to be
highly reliable (α = .93).
Statistical Analysis Strategy
A simple linear regression was conducted to see if severity of stressor (as measured by
the participant’s severity rating) predicts psychological distress (as measured by the DASS-21).
Hierarchical multiple regression analysis were conducted to determine the effect of
coping strategy, severity of stressor, and the interaction between coping strategy and severity on
overall psychological distress. Coping strategies were based on the PCA in the previous section.
Sum scores were computed for each component to be used in the hierarchical regression
analyses.
The sum score for the grouped coping strategies and stressor severity were entered in the
first step of the hierarchical linear regression. In the second step, the interaction between coping
strategies and stressor severity (as computed by the product of the sum score of the coping
strategy grouping and severity of stressor rating) was entered. If a significant interaction was
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detected, follow-up analyses were conducted by analyzing the simple slopes, which is the slope
of one predictor variable at different levels of the other predictor variable. In this study, the slope
of the severity of stressor when predicting general psychological distress was analyzed at
different levels of coping strategy frequency. Data were standardized to z-scores and simple
slope analyses were computed at different levels (one and a half standard deviations above the
mean, one standard deviation above the mean, and one standard deviation below the mean) to
determine the steepness and significance of the slope at these levels. This allowed us to
determine the magnitude of the relationship between severity of stressor and psychological
distress at different levels of frequency of the coping strategy categories. Effect sizes were
reported for the regression analyses using R2, as suggested by Kelly and Preacher (2012).
Confidence intervals for R2 were calculated using the R-square Confidence Interval Calculator
(Soper, 2013).
Prior to the regression analyses, tests for violations of statistical assumptions were
conducted. Missing data, univariate, and multivariate outliers were removed via the procedures
mentioned in Study 1. Following the analysis of missing data and outliers, assumptions of
normality were tested for the component sum scores, severity of stressor, and the DASS-21.
Among the 450 remaining participants, 4 cases (0.89%) were identified as containing univariate
outlying values (|z| ≥ 3.29, p < .001) on the DASS-21 and were removed from the analyses. Zscores were calculated for skew and kurtosis of the variables to check if the variables were
normally distributed. The DASS-21 total scores were significantly skewed (|z| ≥ 3.29, p < .001).
The skew indicates that the majority of participants are reporting lower psychological distress. A
square-root transformation was performed on the DASS-21.
Assumptions of linearity, homogeneity, and homoscedasticity were evaluated by
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examining the scatterplots of the predicted DV scores and errors of prediction. These
assumptions were met for all but one of the regression analyses. The assumption of
homoscedasticity was not met for the regression analysis involving substance use.
Homoscedasticity means that the standard deviations of errors are equal across the entire range
of the predicted variable. A visual inspection of the scatterplot would indicate homoscedasticity
if the overall shape is rectangular. Heteroscedasticity is indicated by a more funnel shape.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) indicate that heteroscedasticity may be caused by skew in
variables and may be improved by transformation of the skewed variable. An inverse
transformation was performed on the Substance Use component given its significant skew (|z| ≥
3.29, p < .001). A visual inspection of the subsequent scatterplot indicated a less severe funnel
shape and thus less heteroscedasticity. Therefore, the transformed Substance Use component
score was used for the subsequent regression analysis.
Correlations between severity of stressor, coping strategy, and the interaction variables
were examined to determine whether there is multicollinearity caused by the interaction term.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2013) indicate that high correlations (r = ≥ .90) indicate multicollinearity
(p. 88). Correlations between the variables range from r = .86, p < .001 to r = .09, p = .051,
which indicates that there is not multicollinearity among the variables.
Results
Severity of Stressor and Level of Distress
For the first step, we used the severity of stressor ratings predict overall psychological
distress using a simple linear regression. As expected, severity of stressor positively significantly
predicted psychological distress such that as severity of stressor increased the psychological
distress increased as well: β = .261 t(444) = 5.99, p = < .001 (see Figure 1). The effect size was
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small (R2 = .075, 95% CI [.028, .122]) and indicated the severity of stress rating predicted 6.8%
of the variance in overall psychological distress.
Figure 1: Severity of Stressor Scores by Transformed DASS-21 Total Score

Mindfulness and Engagement Coping Strategies
Endorsement of mindfulness and engagement coping strategies, as defined by the sum
score of the component from principal components analysis, and the severity of the stressor were
used to predict psychological distress. Severity of stressor and mindfulness and engagement
coping were entered into a hierarchical regression in the first step, and the interaction was
entered into the second step.
For the first step, severity of stressor continued to positively and significantly predict
psychological distress, even when controlling for the coping strategy: β = 0.26, t(443) = 5.99, p <
.001, pr2 = .075. However, mindfulness and engagement as a coping strategy did not
significantly predict psychological distress when controlling for severity of stressor, β = -.007,

57

t(443) = -.355, p = .723, pr2 < .001. The overall effect size for the model was similar to that in
the previous section, small (R2 = .075, 95% CI [.028, .122]).
In step 2, we entered the interaction between severity of stressor and coping strategy. The
interaction was not significant, suggesting that the effects of severity of stressor on overall
psychological distress is not conditional on our measure of mindfulness and engagement as a
coping strategy, β = -.01, t(442) = -1.79, p = .075, pr2 = .007.
Psychologically Inflexible Coping Strategies
Endorsement of psychologically inflexible coping strategies, as defined by the sum score
of the component from principal components analysis, and the severity of the stressor were used
to predict psychological distress. Severity of stressor and psychologically inflexible coping were
entered into a hierarchical regression in the first step, and the interaction was entered into the
second step.
For the first step, severity of stressor continued to positively and significantly predict
psychological distress, even when controlling for the coping strategy: β = 0.25, t(443) = 5.74, p <
.001, pr2 = .069. In addition, psychological inflexibility as a coping strategy did not significantly
predict psychological distress when controlling for severity of stressor, β = .03, t(443) = 1.10, p =
.271, pr2 = .003. The overall effect size for the model was similar to that in the previous section,
small (R2 = .077, 95% CI [.030, .124]).
In step 2, we entered the interaction between severity of stressor and coping strategy. The
interaction was significant, suggesting that the effects of severity of stressor on overall
psychological distress is conditional on our measure of mindfulness and engagement as a coping
strategy, β = -.02, t(442) = -2.18, p = .030, pr2 = .01, ΔR2 = .010 (Table 4).

58

Table 4. Hierarchical Linear Regression Coefficients of Severity of Stress, Psychological
Inflexibility, and the Interaction between Severity of Stress and Avoidance
Standardiz
ed
Coefficien
ts

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model
1

2

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.
<.001
<.001

(Constant)
Severity

3.513
.253

.322
.044

.265

10.913
5.740

PsyInflex

.026

.024

.051

1.102

.271

2.403
.481
.138

.602
.113
.057

.505
.267

3.993
4.242
2.444

<.001
<.001
.015

-.022

.010

-.361

-2.181

.030

(Constant)
Severity
PsyInflex
Severity*PsyInfle
x

Notes: R2 = .077, p < .001; ΔR2 = .010, p= .030
A simple slope analysis was performed using standardized variables. For individuals who
endorsed higher levels of psychological inflexibility, the relation between severity of stressor and
psychological distress was of lesser magnitude. Engagement in less psychological flexibility, as
defined by one SD below the mean, predicted more distress as severity of stressor increased, β =
.37, t(442) = 5.73, p < .001. Slopes for lines representing participants who engaged in more
psychological inflexibility indicate a decrease in the relationship with distress.
When engagement was defined as one SD above the mean, the slope of the line was still
significant but smaller than one SD above the mean indicating that engagement in more
psychologically inflexible coping predicts more distress as severity of stressor increased, β = .17,
t(442) = 2.78, p = .006. This slope is smaller than the one for less psychological inflexibility,
indicating that the relationship between psychological inflexibility, severity, and distress
decreases as engagement in inflexible coping increases.
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For engagement in higher levels of psychological inflexibility (as defined by 1.5 SD
above the mean), the slope of the line is no longer significant, indicating that the relationship
between severity and distress decreased to a non-significant level β = .12, t(442) = 1.52, p =.128.
Higher levels of psychological inflexibility predicted higher levels of psychological distress at
low severity of stress and remained relatively stable as severity increases. With lower levels of
inflexibility, predicted distress is lower for low levels of distress and increases as severity of
stressor increases (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Interaction of Severity of Stressor and Psychological Inflexibility by Transformed
DASS-21 Total Score
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Substance Use Coping Strategies
Endorsement of substance use coping strategies, as defined by the sum score of the
component from principal components analysis, and the severity of the stressor were used to
predict psychological distress. Severity of stressor and substance use coping were entered into a
hierarchical regression in the first step, and the interaction was entered into the second step.
Because of the significant skew of the substance use score, the component score was
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transformed. For the following analyses, the inverse of the component score is used. Therefore,
higher scores indicate less use while lower scores indicate more use.
For the first step, severity of stressor continued to positively and significantly predict
psychological distress, even when controlling for the coping strategy: β = 0.211, t(443) = 5.03, p
< .001, pr2 = .054. In addition, substance use as a coping strategy significantly predicted
psychological distress when controlling for severity of stressor, β = -15.08, t(443) = -7.06, p
<.001, pr2 = .121. The overall effect size for the model was a medium effect size (R2 = .165,
95% CI [.097, .221]).
In step 2, we entered the interaction between severity of stressor and coping strategy. The
interaction was not significant, suggesting that the effects of severity of stressor on overall
psychological distress is not conditional on our measure of substance use as a coping strategy, β
= .089, t(442) = .099, p = .921, pr2 < .001.This indicates that across severity of stressor, more
use of substances to cope with stress predicts increased psychological distress (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Severity of Stressor and Substance Use on Square Root of DASS-21 Scores
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Present Values Coping Strategies
Endorsement of present values and the severity of the stressor were used to predict level
of distress. Present values and severity of stressor were entered into a hierarchical regression in
the first step, and the interaction was entered into the second step.
For the first step, severity of stressor continued to positively and significantly predict
psychological distress, even when controlling for the coping strategy: β = 0.270, t(443) = 6.08, p
< .001, pr2 = .077. In addition, present-moment values as a coping strategy did not significantly
predict psychological distress when controlling for severity of stressor, β = -0.027 t(443) = -1.05,
p = .296, pr2 = .003. The overall effect size of the model was similar to the initial simple
regression, small (R2 = .077, 95% CI [.030, .124]).
In step 2, we entered the interaction between severity of stressor and present values
coping. The interaction was significant, suggesting that the effects of severity of stressor on
overall psychological distress is conditional on our measure of present focused values as a
coping strategy, β = -.03, t(442) = -2.99, p = .003, pr2 = .020, ΔR2 = .018 (Table 5).
Table 5. Hierarchical Linear Regression Coefficients of Severity of Stress, Present Values, and
the Interaction between Severity of Stress and Present Values
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Model

B

1

4.055
.270
-.027

2

(Constant)
Severity
PresentValues

Standardized
Coefficients

Std. Error
.396
.044
.026

(Constant)
2.122
.756
Severity
.682
.145
PresentValues
.113
.053
Severity*PresentValues
-.029
.010
2
Notes: R2 = .077, p < .001; ΔR = .018, p= .003
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Beta

t

Sig.

.284
-.049

10.247
6.080
-1.047

<.001
<.001
.296

.716
.204
-.561

2.807
4.718
2.118
-2.990

.005
<.001
.035
.003

A simple slopes analysis was performed on standardized variables to look at the relationship
between severity and distress at different levels of engagement in the coping strategy.
Engagement in less present values, as defined by one SD below the mean, predicted greater
levels of distress as severity of stressor increased, β = .42, t(442) = 6.37, p < .001.
Slopes for lines representing engagement in more present values indicate a decrease in
the relationship with distress. When engagement was defined as one SD above the mean, the
slope of the line is still significant but smaller than one SD above the mean indicating
engagement in present values predicted increased distress as their severity of stressor increased,
β = .17 t(442) = 2.86, p = .004. This slope is smaller than the one for less present-values focused
coping, indicating that the relationship between present-focused values, severity, and distress
decreases as engagement in the coping strategy increases.
For engagement in higher levels of present values (as defined by 1.5 SD above the mean),
the slope of the line is no longer significant, indicating that the relationship between severity and
distress decreased to a non-significant level β = .11, t(442) = 1.42, p =.156. Higher levels of
present values coping predicted stable levels of distress as severity increased. With lower levels
of present values, predicted distress increases as severity of stressor increases (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Interaction of Severity of Stressor and Cog Values on Transformed DASS-21 Scores
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IV. DISCUSSION
Summary
PCA. The current study had two objectives. The first was to create groupings of coping
strategy variables to assist in the assessment of and interpretation of the relationship between
coping strategy and severity of stressor as it predicts psychological distress. A Principal
Components Analysis was performed on the coping strategy items and assessed for adequate
extraction as well as theoretical consistency.
During the initial analysis of the assumptions of the data, the assumption of normality
was violated after transformation of the variables for all of the substance use items, which may
weaken the analyses. All other assumptions and criteria for indices of factorability were met. The
PCA yielded four components with eigenvalues greater than the parallel analysis. Those
components were not found to be highly correlated and thus rotated using an orthogonal rotation.
Upon rotation, those factors were found to account for 13.35 to 11.90% of the variance in the
data. The components consisted of three to five items with poor to adequate internal consistency
(α = .54 to α = .74).
The components were then conceptualized based on the items that loaded. Two
components were consistent with psychologically flexible coping strategies (Mindfulness and
Engagement; Present Values) while two were consistent with psychologically inflexible coping
strategies (Psychological Inflexibility; Substance Use). Given that the items loaded in ways that
are consistent with the broader model, sum scores of the components were used in the analysis of
the interaction between coping and severity of stressor on distress.
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Severity of Stressor, Coping Strategy, and Distress. The second objective of the
current study was to investigate the relations between severity of stressor, coping strategies, and
psychological distress. Specifically, we wanted to look at whether the level of engagement in
coping strategies moderated the relationship between severity of stressor and psychological
distress. The analyses indicate a relation between severity of stressor scores and psychological
distress, which accounted for 7.7% of the variance.
There were two interactions between coping strategy and severity of stress that were
significant in the prediction of psychological distress. The first involved the interaction of
severity of stress and psychologically inflexible coping strategies in the prediction of
psychological distress. As endorsement of psychologically inflexible coping increased, the
relationship between severity of stressor and distress decreased. For higher levels of endorsement
in psychologically inflexible coping, predicted values of distress remained stable across different
levels of severity of stress. However, for those who engaged in less psychologically inflexible
coping, predicted distress was lower for lower levels of severity of stress and increased as
severity increased. Visual inspection of the graph indicates that for low stress events, higher rates
of distress are predicted for those who engage in more psychologically inflexible coping. These
results suggest that psychologically inflexible coping strategies for low stress events may
increase psychological distress.
The second significant interaction involved the interaction of severity of stress and
present-focused values coping strategies in the prediction of psychological distress. As
endorsement of present-focused values coping increased, the relationship between severity of
stressor and distress decreased. With greater endorsement of engagement in present-values
coping, predicted psychological distress remains stable. With less endorsement of engagement in
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this coping strategy, psychological distress is initially low and increases as severity of stress
increases. Visual inspection of the graph indicates that for higher stress events, greater
psychological distress is predicted for lower levels of present values. This indicates that presentfocused values coping strategies for high stress events may decrease psychological distress.
For the substance use coping strategies, there was a significant main effect for substance
use coping strategy endorsement. As expected based on coping strategy literature, substance use
was associated with increased psychological distress and accounted for 9.5% of the variance in
predicting psychological distress and predicted more variance than severity of stressor (9.5%
versus 5.6% of the variance) when added to the same model.
The mindfulness and engagement component did not significantly predict distress as a
main effect or as an interaction although it approached significance (p= .075).
Limitations of Pilot Study Addressed
Modifications were made to address several limitations of the pilot study. First, limiting
the timeframe of the stressor to the past two weeks removed the likelihood that the participant
would simply think back to the most stressful event of the “recent” past. The initial instructions
only indicated a recent event, and the timeframe for the events given ranged from the past week
to more than a year prior. This flexibility in timeframe allowed participants to scan back to a
highly stressful even rather than any stressful event that had happened in the past two weeks. We
expected that given the varied experiences of the student population, there would be a greater
range in severity when restricted to the past two weeks.
The second aspect of the instructions that addressed the restriction of range problem from
the pilot study is that individuals were given the opportunity to rate their own experience in
terms of severity. The previous study created severity scores by obtaining severity ratings from
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over 300 undergraduates and computing an average severity score for each main theme of the
narratives. By using average severity scores, individual differences in experience of a stressor
were reduced which may in turn reduce some of the variance based on individual perceptions of
severity of a stressor. In the current sample, severity scores ranged from 1-10. Only 41.4% of the
participants had severity scores between 6-9 as compared to 80.7% with scores between 6.07 and
8.90 in the pilot study data.
In addition, items were changed from the initial set of coping strategy items to address
the issue of how items were endorsed and conceptual issues with the initial items. In the pilot
study, coping strategies were endorsed with either a “yes” or “no” answer and did not allow for
measuring differences in how frequently people engaged in each strategy. For this study,
participants were allowed to rank on a scale of 1 to 7 how frequently they used each strategy,
which allowed for more variation in how participants respond to each coping strategy. The
current analyses allow us to see relationship between increased engagement in strategies and the
predicted relation to psychological distress.
Finally, one of the concerns from the pilot study involved the ambiguity of some of the
coping strategy items. In the initial study, items were categorized based on conceptual rationales
given for the items although there were some questions as to whether the items were worded
clearly so that participants would be endorsing flexible or inflexible coping. New items were
generated to more closely match the conceptual basis of flexible and inflexible coping.
Fit with the Psychological Flexibility Model
The current study offers some support for the conceptualization of the coping strategy
items as psychologically flexible or inflexible. With respect to the principal components analysis,
items that were associated with psychological flexibility were associated with other items that
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represent aspects of psychological flexibility. The Cronbach’s Alpha levels for the flexible
components ranged from questionable (Mindfulness and Engagement;  to
acceptable (Present-Focused Values; 72. This indicates that the items that comprise
these components do not reflect a high level of interrelatedness. Similarly, items that were
conceptualized as psychologically inflexible coping loaded onto components with other
psychologically inflexible coping items. The Cronbach’s Alpha levels for the flexible
components ranged from poor (Substance Use; 54 to acceptable (Psychological
Inflexibility; 74. However, two items conceptualized as psychologically inflexible
coping did not load onto either component, which indicates that there may be more work to do in
the identification and conceptualization of psychologically flexible and inflexible coping.
The current study offers some modest support for the psychological flexibility model.
With respect to psychologically inflexible coping, two components related to these strategies
emerged. Substance use as a coping strategy is conceptualized as psychologically inflexible due
to the avoidance of experience associated with substance use. In this study, the strongest effects
come from the substance use data. The results indicate that substance use as a coping strategy
predicts greater distress regardless of the severity of stressor. Furthermore, as substance use
increases, the predicted level of distress also increases. This is consistent with the model, which
posits that psychologically inflexible coping leads to poorer outcomes such as distress.
With the component broadly named psychologically inflexible coping, a pattern
consistent with the model also emerges. The effects of severity of stressor on distress is
conditional on the measure of psychologically inflexible coping in this study. This indicates that
there may be situations in which psychologically inflexible coping makes a greater difference in
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distress. While there appears to be less of a difference in distress at higher levels of stress, at low
levels of stress, greater engagement in psychologically inflexible coping predicts greater distress.
With respect to the items conceptualized as psychological flexibility, there were mixed
results. The mindfulness and engagement component did not yield significant results. However,
there was a significant interaction between severity of stressor and present-focused values on
predicted distress. Much like the results related to the psychologically inflexible coping
component, these results indicate that there may be situations in which being present to one’s
values is a more adaptive coping strategy. As severity of stressor increases, more engagement in
present-focused values predicts little to no increase in distress. However, engagement in less
present-focused values predicts increases in distress as severity of stressor increases. This is
consistent with other findings that in some difficult populations or complex clinical
presentations, psychologically flexible coping may be more beneficial than other methods of
coping (Bach & Hayes, 2002; Dimidjian et al., 2006; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006; Clarke et al.,
2014; Lanza et al., 2014).
However, these results may indicate that utilization of these coping strategies without
training and with respect to a wide range of naturally occurring stressors may not lead to
differences in distress that are as robust as those found in treatment studies. Another
interpretation of the results may be that while the refinement of the study led to more significant
results, limitations in the current study may impact the ability to discern and measure the
interaction between naturally occurring stressors and different coping strategies.
Limitations of Current Study. The current study had several continuing limitations.
These limitations include the internal consistency of the components, severity of stressor as a
predictor, the chosen measure of distress, and the utility of the coping strategy items.
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Cronbach’s alpha and the components. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of internal
consistency. According to Schmitt (1996), Cronbach’s alpha is a “function of the interrelatedness
of the items in a test and the test length rather than the homogeneity of the interitem correlations”
(p. 350). Therefore, the low values for Cronbach’s alpha in the study’s components may reflect a
lower level of interrelatedness of the items within each component or reflect the low number of
items per component. However, Schmitt (1996) indicates that with lower reliability within a
scale, the relationship between the variable and other variables is underestimated. The low level
of alpha for several of the components (Substance Use, α = .54; Mindfulness and Engagement;

α suggests that the items on those scales may not be highly interrelated.
Furthermore, analyses run with these scales may underestimate the relationship between the
component score and other variables.
Severity of stressor as predictor and measure of distress. Severity of stressor may not be
the best metric to use for evaluating the efficacy of coping mechanisms as predictors of distress.
It was hypothesized that severity of stressor would predict psychological distress. While this
prediction was accurate, the percent of variance accounted for by this model is 7.5%, which
indicates that the majority of the variance in psychological distress scores is accounted for by
predictors that are not included in this study (e.g., other stressors). It is also possible that the
measure of psychological distress chosen for this study, the DASS-21, does not adequately
measure overall psychological distress. While the DASS-21 measures symptoms of anxiety,
depression, and stress, other measures of distress may more adequately encompass overall
psychological distress.
In addition, because participants are prompted to report symptoms of distress after
writing a narrative about a stressful event, the participants’ scores may be inflated. Henry and
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Crawford (2005) found a mean total score on the DASS-21 of M = 18.86, which corresponds to
the Full DASS mean (M = 18.38). However the mean DASS-21 score for this dataset was M =
32.01. While it is possible that the participants in this sample have higher levels of distress than
the normative sample, it is also possible that this score was inflated by other factors such as
writing about a distressing event or the stress of the end of the semester.
Utility of coping questions/PCA. Items tended to load onto components that conceptually
represent facets of psychological flexibility or inflexibility. However some items or facets of
psychological flexibility and inflexibility may not have been adequately represented in this set of
coping strategies. For example, only one item was conceptualized as a committed action related
item. This item loaded with items that are typically related to mindfulness processes. This
loading may represent how individuals cope in a natural way. However, it may also be due to the
lack of other committed action related items that may group together in the component loadings.
Furthermore, both “I was careful to not let my feelings show” and “I made up reasons in
order to feel better,” did not load onto any of the components in the principal components
analysis. Both items were initially conceptualized broadly as psychologically inflexible coping.
However, neither loaded onto any components related to psychological inflexibility. It may be
beneficial to generate more items that also represent similar theoretical concepts.
For example, “I was careful not to let my feelings show” represents emotional
suppression, which is not explicitly defined in the other items. The other psychologically
inflexible coping strategy items either include substance use or references to thought
suppression. While both thought and emotional suppression are conceptualized as psychological
inflexibility, it may be the case that people employ these strategies differently, thus the lack of
loading onto any of the components.
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Similarly, the item, “I made up reasons in order to feel better,” did not load onto any of
the components. While conceptually this item was generated to differentiate focusing on
meaning/reasons as an avoidant strategy, it is possible that this item was not worded clearly
enough to differentiate reasons as an avoidant strategy versus bringing to mind values in order to
cope in a more psychologically flexible way. Revision of this item as well as the generation of
more items that represent inflexible ways to engage in values may be warranted.
Because there may be differences in the number of items that conceptually represent
different aspects of the theory, it may be beneficial to generate more items that reflect similar
coping strategies. It may also be useful to expand the coping strategies to include other items that
reflect other ways of coping in flexible and inflexible ways to potentially strengthen the
relationship between the strategy and distress. For example, if someone engages in coping
strategies that are inflexible but not specified by the items presented, the level of engagement in
inflexible coping strategies may not be accurately represented by the current data.
Future Directions
In the current dataset, participants were presented with the stimuli in the same order.
However, as mentioned in the limitations, presentation of the stressful event and the coping
strategies may lead to higher ratings of psychological distress. Future studies may employ
randomization of the order of the measures in order to test for differences in distress based on
presentation order. Given that severity of stressor only accounts for 7.5% of the variance in
distress scores, it may be beneficial to include additional items to measure factors that may
influence psychological distress (e.g. chronic stressors, health concerns, psychological diagnoses,
SES).
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In addition, because the current coping items may not sufficiently encompass what is
meant by psychological flexibility or inflexibility, future research is needed create additional
items to attempt to address the gaps. Creating more items that conceptually represent the
processes involved in psychological flexibility and inflexibility and then analyzing the
component loadings of the coping items with the new items included may address this. In
addition, these coping strategy statements are not exhaustive and may not cover the range of
strategies that participants use to cope with their stressors. As such, it may be useful to have
participants generate lists of their own coping strategies.
Finally, the current data reflect past events and participants’ recall of both those events
and how they coped with the stressor. While the time frame of the narrative was addressed by
changing the instructions, the method utilized in this study relies solely on retrospective selfreport data. Stone and colleagues (1998) investigated the relationship between retrospective
recall and ecological momentary assessment with respect to coping strategy endorsement and
found discrepancies between participants’ retrospective and ecological momentary self-reports of
coping. Participants under-endorsed cognitive items by indicating they engaged in these coping
strategies in the moment but failed to report that they did in retrospective measures on average
31.4% of the time. Participants over-endorsed behavioral coping strategies by not reporting
engaging in these in the moment but reporting they did engage in retrospective measures on
average of 52.4% of the time (Stone et al., 1998). This indicates that retrospective self-report of
coping may not yield the most accurate picture of coping strategies that were utilized. Therefore,
momentary event sampling of stressful events, coping strategies, and outcomes may be of
interest in future studies to obtain more accurate and valid data to investigate these relations
between coping and distress.
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Conclusion
Psychological flexibility has been found to successfully improve functioning across many
(e.g., chronic pain, psychosis, anxiety, and depression) (Ruiz, 2010; Hayes et al., 2006). In
addition, studies have found that coping strategies associated with psychological inflexibility are
related to decreased functioning (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Ruiz, 2010;
Hayes et al., 2006). This study was designed to attempt to study the interaction between severity
of stressor and psychologically flexible and inflexible coping strategies in relation to
psychological distress. While there were some significant differences in distress for several types
of coping strategies, the effects were small. However, the relations between severity and coping
strategy with respect to predicting distress were consistent with the psychological flexibility
model. Continued research may help elucidate the impact flexible and inflexible coping
strategies have on functioning and distress with respect to naturally occurring stressors.
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Demographics Questionnaire

Please answer each of the following questions by indicating the correct response or filling in the
blank.
Gender:
Male
Female
Age: ____________________
Ethnicity:
African-American
Asian
Caucasian
Hispanic/Latino
Other
Year in school
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

Country of Origin:
United States
Other
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Revised Coping Statements
Think about a specific event you experienced in the past 2 weeks that was frustrating or stressful.
Describe this event in the box below. Be sure to include the following details: where it took
place, who was involved, and what made this event frustrating/stressful.

Please indicate whether the stressor you just wrote about has been resolved or is still ongoing.
_____ Resolved
_____ Ongoing
Now think about the most stressful experience you’ve ever had in your entire life. With that in
mind, think about the stressful event you wrote about and rate it on a scale of 1 to 10 as to how
stressful that event was, with 1 being ‘not at all stressful’ and 10 being ‘extremely stressful/the
most stressful thing I’ve experienced.
Extremely
stressful/most
stressful thing
I’ve
experienced

Not at all
stressful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Now think about the situation you have just described, and how you reacted to it. Then indicate
on a scale of 1 to 7 how frequently you did each of the following, with 1 being ‘not at all’ and 7
being ‘very frequently’.
1. I tried to not think about it.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
frequently
7

6

Very
frequently
7

2. I ignored it.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

3. I did something to distract myself from thinking about it (for example: watching TV, sleeping,
shopping, etc.).
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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4. I kept in mind what matters to me (for example: family, friends, education).
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
frequently
7

5. I took my prescribed medication to help myself cope with difficult thoughts and feelings.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
6. I overused prescription medication or took a medication that was not prescribed to me to cope
with difficult thoughts and feelings.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
7. I used alcohol or recreational drugs (not prescribed) to help myself cope with difficult
thoughts and feelings.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8. I used tobacco or nicotine products to help myself cope with difficult thoughts and feelings.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9. I took a medication purchased over-the counter (not requiring a prescription) to help myself
cope.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
10. I was careful to not let my feelings show.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
frequently
7

11. I noticed my thoughts and feelings and did not attempt to change them or push them away.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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12. I stayed open to thoughts and feelings even if they were unpleasant.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
frequently
7

13. I did something that was difficult/uncomfortable because it was connected to something I
care about.
Not at all
Very
frequently
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
14. I did not judge my thoughts and feelings even if they were unpleasant.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

15. I was able to experience my thoughts and feelings without getting stuck in them.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

Very
frequently
7

6

Very
frequently
7

6

Very
frequently
7

6

Very
frequently
7

16. I connected my experience to the things that I value.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

17. I was able to learn something meaningful from the experience.
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

18. I made up reasons in order to feel better.
Not at all
1

2

3

4
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5

Very
frequently
7
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DASS21

Name:

Date:

Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 that indicates how much the statement
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time
on any statement.
The rating scale is as follows:
0 Did not apply to me at all
0 Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time
2 Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time
3 Applied to me very much, or most of the time
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

I found it hard to wind down
I was aware of dryness of my mouth
I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feeling at all
I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing,
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)
I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things
I tended to over-react to situations
I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands)
I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy
I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make
a fool of myself
I felt that I had nothing to look forward to
I found myself getting agitated
I found it difficult to relax
I felt down-hearted and blue
I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with
what I was doing
I felt I was close to panic
I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything
I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person
I felt that I was rather touchy
I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical
exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)
I felt scared without any good reason
I felt that life was meaningless
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0
0
0

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

0

1

2

3

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

0

1

2

3

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

0

1

2

3

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

0

1

2

3

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3
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Original Coping Statements
Think about a specific stressful event you experienced recently. Describe this event in the box
below. Be sure to include the details such as where it took place, who was involved, and what
made this event important.

Think about the situation you have just described, and how you reacted to it. Then indicate if you
if you did any of the following.
1. I tried not to think about it/ignored it. YES / NO
2. I did something to think about it less, such as going to the movies, watching TV, reading,
daydreaming, sleeping, or shopping. YES / NO
3. I searched for meaning in the experience. YES / NO
4. I tried to think positive thoughts. YES / NO
5. I used a prescribed medication to help myself get through it. YES / NO
6. I used alcohol or other drugs (not prescribed) to help myself get through it. YES / NO
7. I used a medication purchased over-the-counter (not requiring a prescription) to help myself
get through it. YES / NO
8. I was careful not to let my feelings show. YES / NO
9. I noticed my thoughts and feelings and did not attempt to change them. YES / NO
10. I was open to whatever thoughts and feelings came up even if they were unpleasant. YES /
NO
11. I did something that was difficult/uncomfortable because it was important for me to do so.
YES / NO
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Reasons

Learn
Meaning

Values2

Not Stuck

Non Judge

Difficult
Behavior

Open

Notice

Suppress
Emo

OTC Meds

Tobacco

Alc/ Drugs

Overuse
Meds

RxMeds

Values1

Distract

Ignore

Not Think

0.21

0.09

0.09

0.07

0.07

0.04

< .01

-0.02

0.19

0.03

< .01

0.08

-0.07

0.07

0.17

0.5

0.49

1

Not
Think

0.15

-0.03

-0.02

0.05

0.11

-0.01

-0.07

-0.04

0.11

0.04

0.01

0.11

< .01

-0.01

0.07

0.48

1

0.49

0.23

0.1

0.11

< .01

0.11

-0.02

-0.1

-0.05

0.16

0.1

0.04

0.21

0.04

0.01

0.26

1

0.48

0.5

0.23

0.39

0.47

0.19

0.16

0.18

0.16

0.04

0.21

-0.02

0.05

0.06

-0.03

0.04

1

0.26

0.07

0.17

0.07

-0.01

0.04

-0.03

-0.08

0.07

-0.01

-0.04

<.01

0.25

0.11

0.11

0.39

1

0.04

0.01

-0.01

0.07

0.08

<.01

-0.02

<.01

-0.04

0.02

-0.03

0.01

-0.02

0.48

0.21

0.32

1

0.39

-0.03

0.04

< .01

-0.07

Ignore Distract Values 1 Rx Meds Overuse
Meds

0.18

0.01

0.01

0.02

0.01

0.09

<.01

0.07

0.06

0.23

0.35

1

0.32

0.11

0.06

0.21

0.11

0.08

0.09

0.08

0.1

-0.01

0.05

0.08

0.11

0.04

0.1

0.22

1

0.35

0.21

0.11

0.05

0.04

0.01

< .01

Alc/ Tobacco
Drugs

0.1

<.01

0.02

-0.03

-0.01

0.07

-0.01

0.04

-0.01

1

0.22

0.23

0.48

0.25

-0.02

0.1

0.04

0.03

0.18

0.11

0.15

0.05

0.05

0.07

0.06

0.03

1

-0.01

0.1

0.06

-0.02

<.01

0.21

0.16

0.11

0.19

0.14

0.09

0.2

0.23

0.38

0.17

0.32

1

0.03

0.04

0.04

0.07

0.01

-0.04

0.04

-0.05

-0.04

-0.02

OTC Suppress Notice
Emo
Meds

0.06

0.27

0.29

0.34

0.35

0.31

1

0.32

0.06

-0.01

0.11

<.01

-0.03

-0.01

0.16

-0.1

-0.07

< .01

Open

0.13

0.22

0.41

0.17

0.39

1

0.31

0.17

0.07

0.07

0.08

0.09

0.02

0.07

0.18

-0.02

-0.01

0.04

0.12

0.23

0.34

0.45

1

0.39

0.35

0.38

0.05

-0.01

0.05

0.01

-0.04

-0.08

0.16

0.11

0.11

0.07

Difficult Non
Behavior Judge

0.07

0.37

0.37

1

0.45

0.17

0.34

0.23

0.05

-0.03

-0.01

0.02

<.01

-0.03

0.19

< .01

0.05

0.07

Not
Stuck

0.2

0.51

1

0.37

0.34

0.41

0.29

0.2

0.15

0.02

0.1

0.01

-0.02

0.04

0.47

0.11

-0.02

0.09

Values2

0.18

1

0.51

0.37

0.23

0.22

0.27

0.09

0.11

<.01

0.08

0.01

<.01

-0.01

0.39

0.1

-0.03

0.09

1

0.18

0.2

0.07

0.12

0.13

0.06

0.14

0.18

0.1

0.09

0.18

0.08

0.07

0.23

0.23

0.15

0.21

Learn Reasons
Meaning

Correlation Matrix
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Items by Component
Component 1 (Mindfulness and Engagement)
I noticed my thoughts and feelings and did not attempt to change them or push them away.
I stayed open to thoughts and feelings even if they were unpleasant.
I did something that was difficult/uncomfortable because it was connected to something I care
about.
I did not judge my thoughts and feelings even if they were unpleasant.
I was able to experience my thoughts and feelings without getting stuck in them.
Component 2 (Substance Use)
I took my prescribed medication to help myself cope with difficult thoughts and feelings.
I overused prescription medication or took a medication that was not prescribed to me to cope
with difficult thoughts and feelings.
I used alcohol or recreational drugs (not prescribed) to help myself cope with difficult thoughts
and feelings.
I used tobacco or nicotine products to help myself cope with difficult thoughts and feelings.
I took a medication purchased over-the counter (not requiring a prescription) to help myself
cope.
Component 3 (Psychological Inflexibility)
I tried to not think about it.
I ignored it.
I did something to distract myself from thinking about it (for example: watching TV, sleeping,
shopping, etc.).
Component 4 (Present Values)
I kept in mind what matters to me (for example: family, friends, education).
I connected my experience to the things that I value.
I was able to learn something meaningful from the experience.
Didn’t Load
I was careful to not let my feelings show.
I made up reasons in order to feel better.
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Research Assistant
Rice University, Houston, Texas
Duties: subject interviewing and screening, administered experimental
conditions to subjects; data entry and analysis; lab organization and
management; lab assistant training; assisted in developing
experimental conditions and design of experiments
Supervisor: Denise Chen, Ph.D.

2003-2004

Lab Manager
Rice University, Houston, Texas
Duties: organizing and delegating tasks; monitoring performance of other
lab members; monitoring the progress of experiments
Supervisors: Denise Chen, Ph.D.

TEACHING/TRAINING POSITIONS:
Instructor, General Psychology – Fall 2013, Spring 2011, Fall 2010, Spring 2010, Fall 2009
Instructor, Introduction to the Major – Spring 2010
Instructor, Abnormal Psychology – Spring 2009, Fall 2008
Teaching Assistant, Stress in the Modern World – Fall 2012, Spring 2012, Fall 2011
Teaching Assistant, Theories of Learning (Graduate Level) – Fall 2009
Teaching Assistant, Learning – Spring 2008
Teaching Assistant, Abnormal Psychology – Fall 2008

WORKSHOPS/TRAININGS:
Attendee, GreenZone Training, coordinated by the University of Memphis Counseling Center,
Memphis, TN, Fall 2014
Attendee, SafeZone Training, coordinated by the University of Memphis Counseling Center,
Memphis, TN, Fall 2014
Attendee, ACT Founders Boot Camp, coordinated by the Association for Contextual Behavioral
Science, Reno, NV, February 2014
Attendee, Mental Health First Aid, coordinated by the University of Memphis, Memphis, TN,
Fall 2014
Co-Facilitator, Using Appreciation in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy, conducted by
Wilson, K.G., Flynn, M.K., & Lucas, N.N. Workshop at the annual meeting of the
Association for Contextual Behavioral Science in Reno, NV, June 2010
Co-Facilitator, Learning Hexaflex Processes Using Mindfulness for Two Videos, conducted by
Wilson, K.G., Sandoz, E.K., Flynn, M.K., Slater, R.M., Lucas, N.N., & Nassar, S.L.
Workshop at the annual meeting of the Association for Contextual Behavioral Science in
Enschede, Netherlands, June, 2009.
Co-Facilitator, ACT for Public Speaking, at University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, April 2009
Attendee, Acceptance and Commitment Therapy Introduction and Skill Building Workshop,
conducted by Kelly G. Wilson, Ph.D., in Memphis, TN, August 2008
Attendee, Introductory ACT Workshop, conducted by Steve Hayes, Ph.D., at the ACT Summer
Institute IV, Chicago, IL, May 2008
Co-Facilitator, Let’s Talk about Sex! Understanding and Supporting Sexual Minorities,
conducted by Gilberte Bastien and Nadia N Lucas. Colloquium presented at the
University of Mississippi Psychology Department, University, MS May 2008
Co-Facilitator, Stress Management for North Mississippi Regional Center Staff, conducted by J.
Scott Bethay, Stephanie Nassar, and Nadia N. Lucas, at North Mississippi Regional
Center, Oxford, MS, March 2008
Attendee, Allies Training, coordinated by the University of Mississippi Counseling Center and
Outreach Programming, Oxford, MS, October 2007
PUBLICATIONS:
Wilson, K. G., Flynn, M. K., Bordieri, M., Nassar, S., Lucas, N., & Whiteman, K. (2012).
Acceptance in Cognitive Behavior Therapy. In W. O’Donohue & J. Fisher (Eds.)

Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Core Principles for Practice. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Wilson, K. G., Bordieri, M., Flynn, M. K., Lucas, N. & Slater, R. M. (2010). Understanding
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in context: A history of similarities and
differences with other cognitive behavior therapies. In J. Herbert & E. Forman (Eds.),
Acceptance and Mindfulness in Cognitive Behavior Therapy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Chen, D., Katdare, A., & Lucas, N. (2006). Chemosignals of Fear Enhance Cognitive
Performance in Humans. Chemical Senses, 31, 415-423.
PRESENTATIONS:
Lynch, J.T., Beasley, B.N., Bethley, N.N., Thomas, C. (2015, May). Remaining undiscovered:
Barriers in student vocational identity development. Paper presented at the annual
meeting for Memphis in May Student Affairs Conference, Memphis, TN.

Dingus, C. Bethley, N., Flynn, M., Schnezter, L., Kurz, S., Wilson, K.G., & Kellum, K. (2014,
May). When college gets hard: Exploring the relationship between coping strategy
engagement and severity of stress. In K. LaGrange (Chair), Strengthening College
Survival: Contextual Behavioral Science and College Student Well-Being. Symposium
presented at the 40th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis,
Chicago, IL.
Lucas, N. & Nicholson, J. (2013, May). Early intervention: Meeting students where they are.
Paper presented at the annual meeting for Mississippi Association of Campus Student
Affairs Professionals, Hattiesburg, MS.
Lucas, N., Kurz, S., Flynn, M., Schnezter, L., Slater, R., Wilson, K.G., & Kellum, K. (2012,
May). Stress in the modern world: An acceptance and commitment therapy-based
approach to dealing with college stressors. In K. Ho (Chair), Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy in the Classroom: Promoting adaptive coping and adjustment
through psychological flexibility and academic engagement. Symposium presented at
the 38th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, Seattle, WA.
Slater, R., Lucas, N. Flynn, M., Kellum, K., & Wilson, K.G. (2011, May). Behaving while
teaching: measuring the effects of student feedback on new instructor behavior. In J.
Barnes (Chair), Improving Our Own Teaching in the Class and in the Lab. Symposium
presented at the 37th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis,
Denver, CO.
Flynn, M. K., Wilson, K. G., & Kellum, K. K., Nassar, S. L., Slater, R. M., Lucas, N. N.,
Bordieri, M., Bethay, S., Kolivas, E., & Kirkland, K. (June, 2010). Exploring the use of
the Hexaflex Functional Dimensional Experiential Interview. Paper presented at the
annual meeting for the Association for Contextual Behavioral Science, Reno, NV.

Flynn, M., Lucas, N. Wilson, K.G., & Kellum, K. (2010, May). Effects of Student and Observer
Feedback on Teaching Behaviors of New Instructors. In M. Flynn (Chair), Applying
Basic Behavioral Principles to Improve Academic Performance, Teaching Skills, and
Research Lab Management at a Southern University. Symposium presented at the 36th
Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis, San Antonio, TX.
Lucas, N., Flynn, M., Wilson, K.G., & Kellum, K. (2010, May). Why am I in college? Bringing
values to the classroom. In M. Flynn (Chair), Applying Basic Behavioral Principles to
Improve Academic Performance, Teaching Skills, and Research Lab Management at a
Southern University. Symposium presented at the 36th Annual Convention of the
Association for Behavior Analysis, San Antonio, TX.
Lucas, N. (Presented due to presenter asbsence). Ambrose, C., Peterson, C., Carstens, B. A.,
Slater, R M., Wilson, K. G., & Kellum, K. (2010, May). Mindfulness for two revisited:
Manipulating the therapist. Paper presented at the 36th Annual Convention of the
Association for Behavior Analysis, San Antonio, TX.
Flynn, M. K., Wilson, K. G., Kellum, K. K., Nassar, S. L., Slater, R. M., Lucas, N. N., Bordieri,
M., Bethay, S., Kolivas, E., & Kirkland, K. (May, 2010). Exploring the use of the
Hexaflex Functional Dimensional Experiential Interview. Paper presented at the annual
meeting for the Association for Behavior Analysis International, San Antonio, TX.
Lucas, N., Slater, R. M., Wilson, K. G., & Kellum, K. (2009, July). The effect of commitment
and behavior change processes in ACT on public speaking anxiety. Paper presented at the
ACBS World Conference III, Enschede, Netherlands.
Slater, R. M., Lucas, N., Wilson, K. G., & Kellum, K. (2009, July). Mindfulness at the front of
the room: An evaluation of ACT for public speaking anxiety. Paper presented at the
ACBS World Conference III, Enschede, Netherlands.
Lucas, N., Slater, R. Wilson, K.G. & Kellum, K. (2009, May). The effect of commitment and
behavior change processes in ACT on public speaking anxiety. In N. Lucas (Chair),
Exploring the Hexaflex: Investigations into Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
Processes and Anxiety. Symposium presented at the 35th Annual Convention of the
Association for Behavior Analysis, Phoenix, AZ.
Lucas, N. (Presented due to presenter absence), Martin, L., Sandoz, E.K., & Wilson, K.G. (2009,
May). Verbal processes associated with disordered eating. In K.Kellum (Chair),
Flexibility with Body Image, Disordered Eating, and Valued Living. Symposium
presented at the 35th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis,
Phoenix, AZ.
Lucas, N., Drake, C., Weinstein, J. & Wilson, K. G. (2008, May). Judge thy Neighbor as
Thyself: An Investigation and Disruption of Verbal Processes in Anti-Muslim
Prejudice. In R. Vilardaga (Chair), Human Objectification, Part I: Using Basic Science
to Address Prejudice. Symposium presented at the 34th Annual Convention of the
Association for Behavior Analysis, Chicago, IL.

Bethay, S., Wilson, K. G., Lucas, N., Moyer, K., & Nassar, S. L. (2008, May). Acceptance and
Commitment Training (ACT) to address burnout in staff caring for clients with
intellectual disabilities (ID). In R. Slater (Chair), ACT Outside the Clinic: Application
of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy to Non-clinical Populations. Symposium
presented at the 34th Annual Convention of the Association for Behavior Analysis,
Chicago, IL.
Chen, D., Zhou, W., Meusburger, T., Lucas, N. (2005, April). Emotional Familiarity and the
Detection of Emotional Chemosignals. Poster presented at the 27th Annual Convention
of the Association for Chemoreceptive Senses, Sarasota, FL.
Chen, D., Lucas, N., Katdare, A., Lin, J., Feld, I. (2004, April). The Effect of Human Emotional
Chemosignals on Task Performance. Poster presented at the 26th Annual Convention
of the Association for Chemoreceptive Senses, Sarasota, FL.
HONORS AND AWARDS:
2005-2013
Graduate Minority Fellowship
2003-2005
NIH Minority Student Research Supplementary Grant
2001-2005
Trustee Distinguished Scholarship, Rice University
2001-2003
Century Scholar, Rice University
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:
Association for Behavior Analysis International, Student Affiliate
American Psychological Association, Student Affiliate
Association for Contextual Behavioral Science, Member

